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REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE:
DEFINING THE LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO
SELF-REPRESENTATION AT TRIAL
E. Lea Johnston*
In 2008, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment permits a
trial court to impose a higher competence standard for self-representation than
to stand trial. The Court declined to delineate a permissible representational
competence standard but indicated that findings of incompetence based on a
lack of decisionmaking ability would withstand constitutional scrutiny. To
date, no court or commentator has suggested a comprehensive competence stan-
dard to address the particular decisional context of self-representation at trial.
Conceptualizing self-representation as an exercise in problem solving, this Arti-
cle draws upon social problem-solving theory to identify abilities necessary for
autonomous decisionmaking. The Article develops and applies a normative
theory of representational competence to evaluate particular problem-solving
abilities in light of competing norms of self-representation. It concludes by pro-
posing a representational competence standard.
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[A]s a human being, please, let me handle my own case. I know I
don't know much about law, I don't know anything, but I know
enough to get me through.
Jeffrey Connor'
INTRODUCTION
On April 3, 2006, the Honorable Carmen Espinosa entertained
Jeffrey Connor's third request to discharge his attorney and proceed
pro se.2 Connor expressed distrust in his court-appointed attorney
and disagreed with him on matters of strategy.3 Evidence suggested,
however, that Connor might have impaired mental abilities. Several
years before, Connor had suffered a stroke, possibly secondary to
cocaine abuse. 4 The stroke left him partially paralyzed and might
have damaged the frontal lobe of his brain, impairing his judgment
and cognitive abilities.5 A neuropsychological evaluation indicated
that the defendant "showed word-finding difficulty, memory difficulty,
and some thinking impairment that was secondary to [the] stroke."6
Connor refused evaluation by court-ordered psychologists, 7 but one
1 Brief of the Defendant with Attached Appendix at 6-7, State v. Connor, 973
A.2d 627 (Conn. 2009) (No. S.C. 18101) (quoting Transcript of Record at 21-22,
State v. Connor, No. 18101 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2006)).
2 See Connor, 973 A.2d at 640.
3 See id. at 641.
4 Id. at 636.
5 Id. at 637.
6 Id. at 636 (quoting Dr. Madelyn Baranoski, a court-appointed clinical
psychologist).
7 See id. at 635-37. The defendant refused to cooperate with the first court-
ordered competence exam and staged a hunger strike. See Brief of the State of Con-
necticut-Appellee with Attached Appendix at 5, Connor, 973 A.2d 627 (No. S.C.
18101). He also refused to cooperate with the second team of court-appointed
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expert testified to a "strong possibility" of "significant mental health
problems."8  Connor's behavior oscillated widely: at times, he
appeared lucid and interacted in "an intelligent, reasonable way,"9
while on other occasions he ate his own fecesI0 and appeared "coma-
tose."" This inconsistency prompted the state to charge, 12 and a pre-
vious presiding judge to find,13 that Connor was malingering.14 That
judge had rejected Connor's first self-representation request on the
grounds that his preoccupation with irrelevant matters-including an
apparent obsession with imagined outstanding "worldwide" war-
rants-precluded him from focusing on the pending charges of kid-
napping, larceny, and robbery.1 5 Connor attested that, "although he
could not 'hold any thoughts' when he first was arrested, 'now it
seems like someone is helping me and.., it's got to be God or a spirit
or something."' 16 Connor pleaded with the court to allow him to han-
dle his own case. 17
Assuming that Connor is competent to stand trial, must the judge
grant his motion to proceed pro se? Given evidence of Connor's
mental impairment, may she grant his request? In the wake of Indiana
v. Edwards,18 the answers to these questions remain unclear. Though
mental health professionals and would not sign a release allowing them to examine
his medical records. Id. A third appointed psychologist testified that his repeated
attempts to interview Connor were "so fraught with lack of cooperation' that he ...
w[as] forced to 'look[ ] at [the defendant's] informal behavior on the unit and
devis[e] a [15]-item forced choice test of court knowledge." Id. at 6-7 (third, fourth,
fifth, and sixth alterations in original) (quoting Transcript of Record, State v. Connor,
No. 18101 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2004)). Based on the defendant's thirteen
incorrect answers, the psychologist found that Connor was deliberately giving wrong
answers, was malingering, and was competent to stand trial. See id. at 7.
8 Connor, 973 A.2d at 636 (quoting Dr. Baranoski).
9 Id. at 637 (quoting Dr. Tim Schumacher, a court-appointed clinical psycholo-
gist); see also id. at 639 (describing Connor's pro se requests as "clear, cogent and
ardent" (quoting Judge Miano of the trial court)); id. at 640-42 (noting Connor's
participation in the hearing before Judge Espinosa).
10 See id. at 636.
11 See id. at 638-40.
12 See id. at 639.
13 See id. at 639-40.
14 Indeed, the defendant admitted to refusing to participate in prior proceedings
because the judge was "a total jerk." Id. at 641 (quoting Connor).
15 Id. at 638. Judge Miano granted Connor's second request to represent himself
but later rescinded his permission when the defendant was unresponsive at two hear-
ings. Id. at 639.
16 Id. at 640 (alteration in original) (quoting Connor).
17 See Brief of the Defendant with Attached Appendix, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting
Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 21-22).
18 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
2011]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
competence has been widely discussed by courts and commentators
alike, no clear standards currently exist to define when a criminal
defendant, who is competent to stand trial, may be incompetent to
represent himself.
In Edwards, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment permits a trial court to impose a higher competence standard
for self-representation than to stand trial. The Court declined to
expound upon the contents of a permissible representational compe-
tence standard but indicated that findings of incompetence involving
a lack of decisionmaking ability due to severe mental illness would
withstand constitutional scrutiny.' 9 Post-Edwards, we are left to ask
which abilities are necessary for self-representation. Lower courts
have yet to provide much guidance on how to go about answering this
question.
This ambiguity and void in the law suggest the need for a compe-
tence standard based on normative theories of self-representation and
decisionmaking. Incompetence is ultimately a normative judgment,
expressing society's determination that sufficient interests exist to war-
rant denying a person's right to control his fate. Allowing a mentally
ill individual to control his defense may cast into doubt the accuracy
of a resulting conviction and the legitimacy of the adjudication. At
the same time, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to represent
himself at trial according to his self-defined interests, despite probable
damage to his defense. 20 Balancing the competing norms implicated
by self-representation, this Article suggests that a defendant capable of
autonomous decisionmaking should be allowed to control his
defense, unless a defendant's self-representation poses a grave threat
to the reliability or fairness of the proceeding.21
Self-representation is, at base, an exercise in problem solving, 22
where the major "problem" is the prosecution of one or more crimi-
nal charges. Psychological theories of problem solving identify cogni-
tive, behavioral, and affective abilities requisite for sound
decisionmaking. Social problem-solving theory is one of the earliest
19 See id. at 174-77.
20 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
21 This Article is confined to competence for self-representation at trial It does
not address competence for individuals wishing to represent themselves and plead
guilty.
22 See generally Richard Zorza, Re-Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal Ethics
and Technological Innovation in Legal Practice: From Threat to Opportunity, 67 FoRDHim L.
REV. 2659, 2669 (1999) ("[E]merging technologies will enable the professional and
client to quickly and efficiently obtain and share enough information about the prob-
lem the client is facing, in order to make a jointly informed diagnostic decision.").
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and most comprehensive prescriptive models of decisionmaking. 23
This theory conceives of everyday problem solving as consisting of a
motivational component called problem orientation and four goal-
directed cognitive, behavioral, and affective problem-solving skills. 24
These skills include problem definition and formulation, generation
of alternative solutions, decisionmaking, and solution implementa-
tion.25 In determining those abilities necessary for self-representa-
tion, social problem-solving theory may offer important insight.
Requiring the possession of at least a subset of problem-solving abili-
ties may be an appropriate means to ensure that defendants who wish
to represent themselves at trial are sufficiently capable of recognizing
and advancing their own interests.
This Article derives a representational competence standard from
social problem-solving theory. Part I discusses Edwards and its gui-
dance for a constitutionally permissible representational competence
standard. Part I presents a normative theory of representational com-
petence, which balances the competing norms of autonomy, reliabil-
ity, and fairness. Part III introduces the cognitive, behavioral, and
affective elements of social problem-solving theory and employs the
normative theory developed in Part II to analyze and evaluate the
importance of particular abilities for self-representation at trial. Part
IV discusses the importance of including a causation element in a rep-
resentational competence standard and of precluding self-representa-
tion only for individuals whose functional deficits stem from mental
illness or disability. The Article concludes by suggesting a representa-
tional competence standard.
I. INDIANA V. EDWARDS
In Indiana v. Edwards, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment 26 permits a trial court to require a defendant to meet a
higher threshold of competence for self-representation than to stand
23 See Stephen J. Anderer, Development of an Instrument to Evaluate the Capac-
ity of Elderly Persons to Make Personal Care and Financial Decisions 42, 48-53 (May
1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Allegheny University of Health Sciences) (on
file with Hahnemann Library, Drexel University).
24 See Thomas J. D'Zurilla et al., Social Problem Solving: Theory and Assessment, in
SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING 11, 14 (Edward C. Chang et al. eds., 2004).
25 See id.
26 The majority identifies the Sixth Amendment as the constitutional basis of its
decision, see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169-72 (2008), but its emphasis on the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding suggests that its holding was motivated more
by due process concerns. See id. at 176-78; see also id. at 169, 174-76 (discussing the
relationship of the Dusky/Drope standard to the case at bar).
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trial.27 Edwards was unforeseen, given that the Court in Godinez v.
Moran28 had prohibited an appellate court from imposing a higher
competence standard for self-representation than for standing trial.29
After Godinez, most states assumed that the standard for competence
to represent oneself (denominated in this Article as "representational
competence"30 ) was equivalent to the standard for competence to
stand trial.3 ' Dusky v. United States3 2 established that, to stand trial, a
defendant must possess "sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him. '33 Because Edwards had been found competent to stand trial
27 Id. at 176-78. To effect a valid waiver of counsel, a defendant must "knowingly
and intelligently" forgo the benefits of representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 835 (1975); see alsoJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right
to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused.").
28 509 U.S. 389 (1993). In Godinez, the U.S. Supreme Court responded to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's findings that competence to waive constitutional
rights "requires a higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial"
and that a defendant is competent to waive counsel or plead guilty only if he has the
ability to make a "reasoned choice among the alternatives available to him." Id. at 394
(quoting Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court rejected this approach and the idea that a competence
standard "higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard" must apply to the
decisions of whether to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel. Id. at 398.
29 See Edwards v. State, 854 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), affd in part,
vacated in part, 866 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. 2007), judgment vacated, 554 U.S. 164.
30 The term "representational competence" is intended to capture those abilities
that a court should require a defendant to possess in order to represent himself at
triaL I do not address a defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel or to
plead guilty (either unrepresented or represented).
31 See State v. Connor, 973 A.2d 627, 647-48, 647 n.19 (Conn. 2009).
32 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
33 Id. at 402 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)); see also
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) ("It has long been accepted that a person
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial."). Courts have interpreted this
competence standard to require that a defendant be able to appreciate his status as a
defendant in a criminal prosecution and understand the charges, the purpose of the
criminal process, and the purpose of the adversary system, including the role played
by defense counsel. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants:
Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MtAMI L. REv. 539, 554 & nn.62-63 (1993). After
Godinez, the Dusky standard may also require "the capacity to understand the rights to
[VOL. 86:2
REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE
and to effect a valid waiver of his right to counsel,3 4 the Court of
Appeals of Indiana35 and the Supreme Court of Indiana36 each found
that he was, de facto, competent to represent himself.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Sixth
Amendment37 permits a trial court to impose counsel upon an unwill-
ing defendant found competent to stand trial.3 8 The Court employed
several strands of reasoning in support of its holding. First, the Court
found that precedent 39 -requiring that, to stand trial, a defendant
possess "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyed' 40 --"points
slightly" in the direction of its holding in that it emphasizes the cen-
trality and importance of representation to the competence inquiry.
4
'
Second, the Court found that the varying nature of mental illness calls
for applying a different mental competence standard to different
activities. 42 Third, the Court asserted that allowing a borderline-com-
petent defendant to represent himself is not respectful of his auton-
silence, a jury trial, confrontation, and trial counsel." Christopher Slobogin & Amy
Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lauyer's Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability,
68 FoRDHiAM L. REv. 1581, 1590 (2000).
34 See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 167-68 (2008); id. at 181-82 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also supra note 27 (discussing the standard for a valid waiver).
35 See Edwards v. State, 854 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), affd in part,
vacated in part, 866 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. 2007), judgment vacated, 554 U.S. 164.
36 See Edwards, 866 N.E.2d at 260.
37 See supra note 26.
38 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176-78.
39 The Court found that Faretta and Godinez, while relevant, were not controlling.
See id. at 171-72 (analyzing the applicability of Faretta and Godinez). Faretta did not
consider the issue of competence. See id. at 171. Godinez-which, like Edwards,
involved a "borderline-competent criminal defendant"-held that the Sixth Amend-
ment does not require a defendant to satisfy a higher mental competence standard to
represent himself than to stand trial. See id. at 171-74. Godinez did not address, how-
ever, whether the Constitution permits a trial court to impose a higher competence
standard. See id. at 173-74. Additionally, Godinez involved a defendant who sought to
proceed pro se to enter a plea of guilty, not to go to trial. See id.
40 Id. at 174 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per
curiam)); see also id. ("[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the
capacity.., to consult with counsel... may not be subjected to a trial." (quoting Drope
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975))); id. at 175-76 (further discussing the Dusky
and Drope standards).
41 Id. at 174-76. The Court also referenced Faretta's partial reliance on preexist-
ing state laws, all of which were consistent with a competence requirement for self-
representation. See id.
42 Id. Referencing the ebb and flow of Edwards's lucidity, the Court observed,
"In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky's mental compe-
tence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time
he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense
without the help of counsel." Id. at 175-76.
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omy because the representation could result in a "humiliating"
spectacle. 43 Finally, the Court found its holding consistent with the
government's interests in securing a reliable verdict and an actual-
and apparent-fair trial.44
While the Court declined to speculate as to permissible compo-
nents of a representational competence standard, Edwards indicates
that decisionmaking abilities are particularly relevant to one's compe-
tence to proceed pro se.45 First, the Court's central concern was a
defendant's "mental condition"46 or "mental fitness."47 While these
terms are undefined by the Court, they appear to capture, at least in
part, elements of adjudicative competence, or powers of understanding,
reasoning, and appreciation. 48 After referencing "the basic tasks
needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel," the
Court cited with approval the competence construct developed by
Professor Richard Bonnie. 49 In a series of articles published in the
1990s,5 0 Bonnie made a valuable contribution to the competence liter-
ature by disaggregating adjudicative competence into a foundational
concept of competence to assist counsel51 and a context-dependent
concept of decisional competence.5 2 While at least one commentator
has suggested that Bonnie's construct (albeit amended) should apply
43 Id. at 176.
44 Id. ("[I]nsofar as a defendant's lack of capacity threatens an improper convic-
tion or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most
basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial.... Further,
proceedings must not only be fair, they must 'appear fair to all who observe them.'"
(quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988))).
45 See id. at 174-77.
46 See id.
47 See id. The Court also used the terms "mental capacity," see id. at 174, 176-77,
and "mental competency," see id. at 170-75.
48 See id. at 175-76 (citing and quoting NoRMAN G. PoYrHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICA-
TIVE COMPETENCE 103 (2002)).
49 See id. (citing PoymRiss ET AL., supra note 48, at 103). Adjudicative Compe-
tence, the culmination of research conducted by the MacArthur Foundation Research
Network on Mental Health and the Law, draws upon Professor Richard J. Bonnie's
theoretical framework for competence to stand trial. See POYrHRESS ET AL., supra note
48, at 56-57 (describing Bonnie's conceptual model).
50 See Bonnie, supra note 33, at 539; RichardJ. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992) [hereinafter
Bonnie, A Theoretical Reformulation]; Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants with Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 419 (1990) [hereinafter Bonnie, Mental Retardation].
51 See Bonnie, supra note 33, at 554-55, 561-67.
52 See id. at 554, 557-59, 567-87.
(VOL. 86:2
REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE
to self-representation,5 3 I have argued elsewhere that Bonnie's con-
struct is insufficient for, and somewhat inapplicable to, self-represen-
tation at trial.54 Second, the Supreme Court repeatedly highlighted
the importance of a defendant's expressive ability or communication
skills.5 5 Given the Court's overriding emphasis on mental (as opposed
to physical) competence, however, it is likely that a defendant's inabil-
ity to communicate is relevant to the extent that it signals deficits in
organized or rational thought. Finally, the Court, in passing, lists the
following conditions as impeding self-representation: disorganized
thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, anxiety,
and "other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses."5 6
The U.S. Supreme Court is not alone in failing to delineate the
components of representational competence. Lower courts to date
have provided little guidance as to which abilities should be necessary
for self-representation.5 7 At most, courts require general evaluation of
53 See Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and Self-Representation: Faretta, Godinez
and Edwards, 7 OHIO ST. J. CraM. L. 391, 402-03 (2009).
54 See E. Lea Johnston, Setting the Standard: A Critique of Bonnie's Competency Stan-
dard and the Potential of Problem-Solving Theory for Self-Representation at Trial, 43 U.C.
DAvIS L. Rv. 1605 (2010). Particular abilities identified by Bonnie are critical to
representational competence, including the abilities to understand one's legal situa-
tion, appreciate one's jeopardy, recognize relevant information, and communicate
that information to counsel. See Bonnie, supra note 33, at 551-52, 561. In this way,
Bonnie's analysis serves as an important foundational precursor for the proposal
articulated in this Article.
55 See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (citing "impaired expressive
abilities" as impeding the defendant's ability to represent himself and drawing read-
ers' attention to rambling, nonsensical motions and documents filed by the defen-
dant (quoting Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n & American Academy of
Psychiatry & the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 26, Edwards, 554
U.S. 164 (07-208) [hereinafter APA Brief])); id (referencing a motion drafted by
Edwards). In prior cases, the Court has found that a defendant's ability to communi-
cate effectively may factor into determining whether the Due Process Clause requires
appointment of counsel. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791 (1973) (directing
that "whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for him-
self" should be considered when deciding whether counsel should be appointed to
satisfy due process in the context of a probation hearing).
56 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (quoting APA Brief, supra note 55, at 26).
57 Typical is the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Connor,
in which the court stated:
[W]e do not believe that it is prudent, at least at this time, to attempt to
articulate a precise standard for determining whether a mentally ill or inca-
pacitated defendant who has been found competent to stand trial also is
competent to represent himself at trial. For present purposes, it suffices to
say that the trial court should consider all pertinent factors in determining
whether the defendant has sufficient mental capacity to discharge the essen-
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a defendant's ability "to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his
own defense."58 To the extent that courts are charging court-
appointed psychologists and psychiatrists with the task of evaluating
defendants' ability to proceed pro se, courts appear to be delegating
to those professionals the legal responsibility of defining which abili-
ties are legally necessmy for self-representation. Commentators have
widely criticized courts' tendency to abdicate their role in defining the
legally relevant content of competence standards in the criminal
context.
59
This Article strives to fill the void left by the Court in Edwards and
lower courts by suggesting a standard for representational compe-
tence that is informed both by normative and psychological theory.
The next Part provides a normative theory of representational compe-
tence that balances competing considerations of autonomy, accuracy
of verdicts, and fairness of adjudications. The Article then applies this
theory to discrete problem-solving abilities and concludes by sug-
gesting a comprehensive competence standard.
II. NoRMATIvE THEORY OF REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE
The abilities that a court should include within a representational
competence standard must be derived from a normative conception
of the purposes served by the measure. 60 Arriving at a normatively
appropriate competence standard requires identifying and evaluating
tial functions necessary to conduct his own defense, including the defen-
dant's ability to relate to the court or the jury in a coherent manner.
State v. Connor, 973 A.2d 627, 657 n.32 (Conn. 2009); see also Edwards v. State, 902
N.E.2d 821, 829 (Ind. 2009) ("We ... decline in the absence of experience under the
current Edwards language to attempt to tinker with [the standard for representational
competence].").
58 United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175-76).
59 See, e.g., GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS
136 (3d ed. 2007) ("[C]onclusory reliance on diagnosis or unsubstantiated opinion
[by mental health examiners] will exacerbate the tendency on the part of courts and
lawyers to avoid investigating the competency issue; this abdication in turn will ill
serve defendants, who deserve a legal, not a clinical, determination of competency.");
THOMAS CRsso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 10-19 (2d ed. 2003) (detailing the criti-
cisms waged against forensic mental health evaluations for legal competencies and
recent advances in attempts to mitigate these shortcomings).
60 See, e.g., Bonnie, A Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 50, at 298; Bruce J.
Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental Health
Law, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'V & L. 6, 31 (1995) ("A competency evaluation ... inevita-
bly involves subjective cultural, social, political, and legal judgments that are essen-
tially normative in nature. The decision regarding which standard of competency
should be used turns on moral, political, and legal judgments concerning the appro-
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the values implicated by self-representation and assessing various deci-
sional abilities through the lens of those values. Self-representation by
a marginally competent defendant recognizes and promotes the
autonomy of the defendant but potentially impairs the reliability of
the adjudication, the actual and apparent fairness of the proceeding,
and the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice process. 61 A rep-
resentational competence standard should reflect a balancing of these
values and interests. What is needed, in a nutshell, is to identify the
capacities required by a pro se defendant to exercise meaningful
autonomy and those abilities whose absence makes a trial intolerably
unfair or unreliable.
The fundamental principle served by self-representation, as rec-
ognized in Faretta v. California,62 is autonomy.6 3 The literature justify-
ing the importance of autonomy in the criminal justice context is
surprisingly sparse. 64 Immanuel Kant understood autonomy as a con-
dition of freedom from domination by others and of mastery over
one's inclinations in his choice of ends and actions. 65 The aspect of
autonomy most relevant here-the freedom to select and pursue
priate level of ability that individuals must possess to exercise a variety of liberty and
property interests.").
61 See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (discussing the impact of a marginally competent
defendant's self-representation on his dignity, the objective of providing a fair trial,
the reliability of the adjudication, and the appearance of fairness to observers).
62 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
63 See id. at 834; see also Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 160 (2000)
("[T]he right to self-representation at trial [is] grounded in part in a respect for indi-
vidual autonomy." (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834)); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 176-77 (1984) ("The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and auton-
omy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be
the accused's best possible defense.").
64 See, e.g.,Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 Hous. L. REV. 281 (2003);
EricaJ. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant's Right to Control the
Case, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1147, 1150 n.8 (2010) (cataloguing the paucity of literature
defending the autonomy interest of criminal defendants); id. at 1163-74 (deriving an
argument in support of a criminal defendant's autonomy interest from history, consti-
tutional text, and jurisprudential concerns); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal
Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454; Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client
Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 315, 336-39 (1987); Bruce J.
Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. Rzv. 1705,
1707-15, 1747-77 (1992); cf. Michael S. Green, The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 627,
660-68 (1999) (exploring the extent to which the need to respect the autonomy of
the criminal defendant justifies the privilege against self-incrimination).
65 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785),
reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 43, 89 (MaryJ. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) ("Auton-
omy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself. . . ." (footnote
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one's own ends independently of coercion by others66-resembles
John Locke's enunciation of freedom as an individual's condition "to
think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the pref-
erence or direction of his own mind."67 Personal autonomy as self-
determination is best apprehended as a negative freedom, a freedom
from interference, rather than a positive freedom, a freedom to
receive something.68 The authors of the Bill of Rights "understood
the inestimable worth of free choice" 69 and drafted the Sixth Amend-
ment to honor "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood
of the law."70
Recognizing a criminal defendant's autonomy is justified both on
deontological and utilitarian grounds. 71 A deontological theory of
autonomy holds that all competent individuals have a natural, inalien-
able right to be treated as autonomous persons capable of rational
choice. 72 Kant has argued that the ability to act autonomously serves
as the basis for the distinctive dignity of human beings.73 In Kant's
view, overriding the decisions of a rational defendant in the name of
his "best interests" dehumanizes the defendant, rendering him an
object or a "means" of the attorney's will.74 The value of autonomy "is
not in what choice is ultimately made, but rather in the fact that the
choice is personal to the individual." 75 An individual's values "are
those reasons with which the agent most closely identifies-those that
form the core of his personality, that make him who he is."' 7 6 An indi-
vidual's ability to maintain his identity depends upon his ability to
omitted)); Paul Guyer, Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 20 Soc. PHIL. &
POL'y 70, 80 (2003).
66 Guyer, supra note 65, at 80.
67 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 237 (Peter H. Nid-
ditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1690).
68 See Candace Cummins Gauthier, Philosophical Foundations of Respect for Auton-
omy, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICSJ. 21, 33 (1993); Guyer, supra note 65, at 73.
69 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 (1975) ("And whatever else may be
said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they
understood the inestimable worth of free choice.").
70 Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan,J.,
concurring)).
71 See Strauss, supra note 64, at 336-39.
72 See Winick, supra note 64, at 1715.
73 See KANT, supra note 65, at 85 ("Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity
of human nature and of every rational nature.").
74 See Gauthier, supra note 68, at 24.
75 Laura A. Heymann, The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment
Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REv. 651, 660 (2009).
76 Luban, supra note 64, at 470 (citing Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. PHIL. 205,
216 (1975).
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maintain his values. 77 Thus, any attempt to override the expression of
a person's values by force "directly assaults the integrity of his or her
personality."78 Unencumbered choice is essential for an individual to
fashion his character, and the Kantian approach values autonomy
(the process) even if it may lead to suboptimal results (the product) .79
A court-appointed attorney-and the court, and society as a
whole-may well have different goals, values, and priorities than the
defendant. As John Stuart Mill has observed, the individual is the one
most interested in his well-being and is the most knowledgeable about
his feelings, values, priorities, and circumstances.80 Attorneys and
criminal defendants likely have very different social and economic
standing and may differ in cultural or racial background. 81 As a
result, it may be difficult for an attorney to understand and recognize
his client's values and goals. 82 An attorney's inability to identify accu-
rately his client's values and interests may be particularly acute when
77 See id.
78 Id. at 471; see also id. at 473 ("[O]verriding your real values in the name of
values I impute to you . . . because your values form the core of your personality,
attacks your integrity.").
79 See Heymann, supra note 75, at 661-62.
80 SeeJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTV (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY, REPRESENTA-
TIVE GOVERNMENT, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 5, 94 (Oxford Univ. Press World's Clas-
sics ed. 1946).
He is the person most interested in his own well-being: the interest which
any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in
it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which
society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is frac-
tional, and altogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and
circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge
immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else.
Id.
81 See Strauss, supra note 64, at 329.
82 See Mimi Steward, Just Injustice, 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 230, 240 (1993) ("An attor-
ney from a different socio-economic group, race or gender might fail to recognize
that he and his client operate within different value systems."); id. at 245-46; Strauss,
supra note 64, at 329 ("Attorneys and clients in criminal cases often are separated by
vast differences in social, economic, or racial status. In these circumstances it is diffi-
cult for the attorney to understand fully the underlying wishes and goals of the client.
Communication, which might help minimize certain cultural differences, is typically
not forthcoming." (footnote omitted) (citing Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust
Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEo. L.J. 1015,1035-36 (1981))). For an exploration of
this concept in the area of the workplace, see Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret A. Neale,
What Differences Make a Difference? The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organiza-
tions, 6 PSYCHOL. SCL PUB. INT. 31, 39 (2005), assuming that "surface-level differences,
such as diversity in race or age, also imply differences in underlying attributes, such as
values and beliefs."
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the client is mentally ill. Professor Michael Perlin has argued that
"sanism," an irrational prejudice against the mentally ill on par with
other biases such as homophobia, pervades criminal justice jurispru-
dence and lawyering.83 "Sanism" may manifest in a general tendency
to distrust decisions of persons with mental illness and in assumptions
that individuals who exercise their right to counsel are "crazy" and
incapable of sufficiently autonomous decisionmaking. Beyond an
attorney's biases, an attorney's self-interest may also militate against
recognizing the values and interests of his client.8 4
Respecting the autonomy of an individual is especially crucial
within the context of a criminal trial, where the stakes are high and
decisions are likely to be of great personal value.8 5 A criminal trial
may be the most important event in a person's life.8 6 The outcome of
a criminal trial holds tremendous consequences for the defendant,
potentially affecting his liberty, personal relationships, status in the
community, current and future employment prospects, and personal
identity. As the Court stated in Faretta, "The defendant, and not his
lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a convic-
tion. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to
decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. 8 7
The consequences of coerced representation are particularly dire
given the allocation of decisionmaking authority between counsel and
client. In essence, counsel is vested with the authority to make all
decisions of strategy and tactics.88 The only decisions reserved to
83 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE 21-24, 48-58 (2000); Michael
L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn to Ever Be Governed by Enforced Insanity": Some Therapeutic Juris-
prudence Dilemmas in the Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompetency and Insanity
Cases, 33 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523944.
84 See Strauss, supra note 64, at 329-30 (arguing that a lawyer's interest in conve-
nience, saving time, or maximizing profit may affect the choices he makes on behalf
of his client).
85 See id. at 337.
86 I am grateful to Christopher Slobogin for characterizing the context of a crimi-
nal trial in these terms.
87 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
88 See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 247-50 (2008). Under current
case law, a defendant can control the strategy and tactics of his case only when he
forgoes assistance of counsel. See id.;Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). The
Court recognized this reality in Faretta. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820-21 ("It is true that
when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law and
tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial
strategy in many areas. This allocation can only be justified, however, by the defen-
dant's consent, at the outset, to accept counsel as his representative." (citations
omitted)).
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defendants include whether to plead guilty,89 waive the right to a jury
trial,90 waive the right to counsel,9 1 testify,92 or be present at trial.
93
By foisting a lawyer on an unwilling defendant, we not only force a
defendant to put on his case through counsel, but we also eliminate
his ability to make strategic and tactical decisions concerning his
defense.
Deciding how to respond to the state's charge-with the public
watching-may be of profound personal value to the defendant. He
may wish to win acquittal by asserting a particular right, even when his
attorney believes the legal argument has little merit.94 He may prefer
a guilty verdict to the stigma of being labeled "insane."95 He may want
to use his "day in court" to express a certain political view.96 He may
opt for a term of imprisonment over implicating friends or family,
endangering important personal relationships, jeopardizing his status
in the community, or violating his personal moral code.97 Defendants
who make such choices would not be prioritizing acquittal or the
shortest term of imprisonment, perhaps prompting their attorneys to
89 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
90 See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942).
91 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
92 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987); Jones, 463 U.S. at 751
(dictum).
93 See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 n.24 (1988) (dictum) (citing Cross v.
United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
94 See Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that an attor-
ney may waive the client's right to assert a defense based on the Fourth Amendment
over his objection).
95 See Anne C. Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity Defense on an Unwilling Defen-
dant, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 637-39, 637 n.2 (1980) (listing the "onerous conse-
quences" that may attend a successful insanity defense).
96 See United States v. Robertson, 430 F. Supp. 444, 447 (D.D.C. 1977) (quoting
the defendant as rejecting an insanity defense "for personal reasons of a quasi-politi-
cal nature"); PhillipJ. Resnick, The Political Offender: Forensic Psychiatric Considerations, 6
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY. & L. 388, 391 (1978). A recent, high-profile case where
a defendant's desire to express his political views governed the selection of his trial
defense is the case of Scott Roeder, who killed late-term abortion provider George
Tiller. See Monica Davey, Doctor's Killer Puts Abortion on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2010, at Al (quoting the defendant as testifying to support a voluntary manslaughter
instruction that "I did what I thought was needed to be done to protect the children.
I shot him," and "[i]f I didn't do it, the babies were going to die the next day.").
97 See Luban, supra note 64, at 455-57, 457 n.3 (describing cases in which defend-
ants prioritized the maintenance of relationships or consistency with their "personal
code of honor" over acquittal or large settlements).
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reject their expressed wishes as not maximizing their interests.98 In
the words of Professor David Luban, to impose a lawyer's choices on
an unwilling defendant in the name of the defendant's best interests
"is to miss the extent to which an individual is harmed by being forced
to do something that he believes is wrong."99
Utilitarian arguments also support designating autonomy as the
predominant norm of self-representation. Mill argued that allowing
an individual to frame the plan of his life without state interference is
necessary for both individual happiness and social progress. 100
According to Mill, engaging in autonomous decisionmaking is neces-
sary for the psychological and moral development of the individual
and ultimately for self-fulfillment. 0 1 Mill believed that individuals
assess their own interests and abilities more accurately than the gov-
ernment. 10 2 In Mill's view, individuals are likely to achieve optimal
results if allowed to govern their own affairs, so long as they do so
without causing harm to others. 10 3 Thus, governmental interference
with individual decisionmaking ultimately results in more harm than
allowing individuals to make their own decisions, even if some choices
prove to be unwise. 10 4 In addition, as a general matter, confining per-
missible decisions to those that conform to communal standards of
rationality and reasonableness poses a threat to liberal society and the
marketplace of ideas.105
Allowing criminal defendants to exercise self-determination may
enhance an individual's happiness and maximize societal utility in sev-
eral ways. As the Court stressed in Faretta, "To force a lawyer['s deci-
sions] on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law
contrives against him. 10 6 Permitting the individual to make decisions
consistent with his goals and values best assures that decisions will
maximize individual preferences. 10 7 Because defendants will be most
familiar with the facts underlying the prosecution, they may be in the
best position to select the defense that best corresponds to the
98 See id. at 487-88 & n.79 (observing that "[a]ttorneys are trained in skills almost
exclusively concerned with attaining maximizing ends" such as the shortest sentence
or the largest judgment).
99 Id. at 489.
100 See Gauthier, supra note 68, at 27-29.
101 See Winick, supra note 64, at 1714, 1764.
102 Id. at 1714.
103 Heymann, supra note 75, at 660.
104 See Winick, supra note 64, at 1714.
105 See David J. Garren, Paternalism (pt. 2), 48 PHIL. Booms 50, 53 (2007).
106 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
107 Strauss, supra note 64, at 338.
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truth.108 Cognitive and social psychological theory suggests that self-
determination also amplifies an individual's ability to recognize and
achieve his goals by increasing his motivation and effort.10 9 Other
research suggests that individuals express more satisfaction in the
results of their decisions when they have participated in the decision-
making process. 110 Allowing a defendant to govern his defense may
also reduce feelings of alienation from the legal process and result
ultimately in individuals' gaining greater respect for the rule of law.
One recent empirical study suggests that defendants who
represent themselves do as well-and perhaps may do better-than
those who are represented by counsel. A 2007 study conducted by
Professor Erica Hashimoto found that pro se defendants in state
courts were convicted at rates equivalent to or lower than those of
represented felony defendants."1 Pro se defendants in federal court
did not fare significantly worse than represented defendants. 1 2 One
factor contributing to these findings may be the dismal state of indi-
gent defense in manyjurisdictions. 13 Courts and commentators have
documented inadequate funding for indigent defense systems,"14
inadequate compensation for those who defend indigent defend-
ants, 115 lack of training and supervision for counsel, 116 and inade-
108 See H. Richard Uviller, Calling the Shots: The Allocation of Choice Between the
Accused and Counsel in the Defense of a Criminal Case, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 719, 725, 728
(2000).
109 See Winick, supra note 64, at 1755-68.
110 See Strauss, supra note 64, at 339 & n.107; Winick, supra note 64, at 1767 &
n.261.
111 See Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical
Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. Rv. 423, 447-50 (2007) (presenting data
showing that twenty-six percent of pro se defendants received felony convictions, com-
pared with sixty-three percent of their represented counterparts).
112 See id. at 451-54 (presenting data showing that, while represented defendants
who went to trial were about twice as likely to achieve an acquittal as their pro se
counterparts, the acquittal rate of defendants who went to trial or pleaded guilty was
about the same in both groups).
113 See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,
A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045, 1122-27 (2006) (documenting and
discussing the "true constitutional crisis" of indigent defense in the United States and
suggesting proposals for reform).
114 See id. at 1045-46; Norman Lefstein, The Movement Towards Indigent Defense
Reform: Louisiana and Other States, 9 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 125, 136 (2008).
115 See Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 900-01
(Mass. 2004); N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397 (2003).
116 STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEoN's BROKEN PROMISE 11 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalser-
vices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.
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quate investigative and expert resources, 17 as well as defendants'
experience languishing in jail for long periods without access to an
attorney and feelings of pressure to accept plea bargains in the
absence of counsel's advice.1 18 In these circumstances, it is hardly sur-
prising that defendants with no legal training-but an understanding
of the facts of their cases and a commitment to winning them-may
enjoy similar acquittal rates to those of their represented
counterparts.
While the interest of autonomy is paramount to self-representa-
tion, the U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards recognized that competing
values may warrant overriding a defendant's decision to proceed with-
out counsel. In particular, the Court suggested that a trial court could
deny a motion for self-representation when "a defendant's lack of
capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence" or undercuts
the provision of a fair trial.1 19 The Court also noted that "proceedings
must not only be fair, they must 'appear fair to all who observe
them.' "120
The values of accuracy and fairness appear less fundamental than
respect for a defendant's autonomy, however. Since the original rec-
ognition of the right to self-representation, the Supreme Court has
assumed that judgments in cases involving pro se defendants are less
likely to be accurate or reliable than when defendants are represented
by counsel. 121 In Flanagan v. United States,122 the Court emphasized
that the right to self-representation, like the right to retain counsel of
one's choice, "reflects constitutional protection of the defendant's
free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the
117 See M. Isabel Medina, Reforming Criminal Indigent Defense in Louisiana-An Intro-
duction to the Symposium and a Brief Exploration of Criminal Indigent Defense and Its Rela-
tionship to Immigrant Indigent Defense, 9 Loy.J. PUB. INT. L. 111, 113 (2008); Nat'l Right
to Counsel Comm., Justice Denied: America's Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right
to Counsel, CONST. PROJECT, 61-62, 93-95 (Apr. 2009), http://www.constitution-
project.org/manage/file/1 39.pdf.
118 See Nat'l Right to Counsel Comm., supra note 117, at 86, 89.
119 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
120 Id. at 177 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)).
121 In Faretta, the Court concluded that "[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal
prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their
own unskilled efforts." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975); see also Flana-
gan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984) ("[T]he [Faretta] right reflects constitu-
tional protection of the defendant's free choice independent of concern for the
objective fairness of the proceeding."); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8
(1984) ("[S]elf-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the like-
lihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant . .
122 465 U.S. 259.
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proceeding." 123 In addition, the fact that self-representation typically
involves some degree of indecorum suggests that the value of main-
taining the appearance of fairness should not be sacrosanct. 124
As I have argued elsewhere, a court should allow a defendant
capable of autonomous decisionmaking to control his defense unless
the self-representation poses a grave threat to the reliability, fairness, or
integrity of the adjudication. 125 Recognizing that certain capacities
are requisite to the existence of autonomy, this normative theory leads
to the conclusion that decisional abilities should only be required if
one of two criteria is met. First, representational competence should
require those functional abilities necessarily present for the exercise
of meaningful autonomy.126 Second, a representational competence
standard should include a particular functional ability if its absence
poses a grave threat to the reliability or the actual or apparent fairness
of the adjudication. This standard should be sufficiently deferential
to autonomy while accommodating the Supreme Court's concerns in
Edwards.
The next Part draws upon social problem-solving theory to iden-
tify abilities considered critical for sound, autonomous decisionmak-
ing. Requiring the possession of at least a subset of problem-solving
abilities may be appropriate as a means to ensure that defendants who
wish to proceed at trial unrepresented are sufficiently capable of rec-
ognizing and advancing their own interests. By subjecting problem-
solving abilities to scrutiny through my normative lens, I identify cer-
tain capabilities that may be particularly crucial for representational
competence.
III. THE PROMISE OF PROBLEM-SOLVING THEORY FOR
REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE
Self-representation at trial poses unique challenges for a criminal
defendant and requires a broader array of skills than those necessary
123 Id. at 268.
124 See John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An
Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 483, 487 (1996) ("[M]ost pro se defendant cases disrupt the criminal
justice system to some degree.").
125 SeeJohnston, supra note 54, at 1614, 1626, 1656, 1661.
126 As others have argued, an individual whose decisionmaking capacity is
impaired may be unable to act in an autonomous manner. See, e.g., Luban, supra note
64, at 465-66.
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to make decisions when represented. 127 A represented defendant is
authorized to make only a few decisions within the context of a crimi-
nal adjudication. 28 Ethical responsibilities dictate that, for each of
these decisions, counsel will identify for his client the decision point,
clarify the issue, distill the possible options, gather relevant informa-
tion, perform key analysis, and present his recommendation. 129 The
task left to the defendant is to select among the options outlined by
counsel. Many, if not all, of these decisions are amenable to consider-
ation prior to trial. To participate in these fundamental decisions,
Professor Richard Bonnie and others have asserted that a defendant
should be capable of expressing a choice, understanding relevant
information, and, to a variable extent, reasoning and appreciating the
consequences of the decisions for his case. 130
A pro se defendant, however, faces a markedly different and
more challenging decisional context than his represented counter-
part. To defend himself from prosecution, a pro se defendant will be
called upon to make a multitude of decisions in short succession:
which defense, if any, to exert and how to establish it, which witnesses
to call and what to ask them, whether to testify and what to say, what
evidence to introduce and how to introduce it, whether and how to
cross-examine unfavorable witnesses, whether and how to object to
incompetent evidence, what information to include in opening and
closing statements, and which jurors to strike and on what basis. The
list goes on and on. For each of these decisions, a pro se defendant
must-often unassisted 13 1-identify the relevant decision point,
127 Self-representation at trial likely requires a broader skill set than to plead
guilty. This subject is worthy of separate consideration and is beyond the scope of this
Article.
128 See supra notes 89-93.
129 See Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counse
28 CARDozo L. REV. 1213, 1246 (2006) ("When courts treat defendants as having
absolute control, the defendant's decision will be informed by advice of counsel.").
Counsel has an ethical duty to advise the defendant and assist him in reaching what,
in the attorney's view, is a prudent decision. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
Ducr R. 1.4 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000).
The amount of information that an attorney must disclose varies according to the
situation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 cmt. e ("The
lawyer ordinarily must explain the pros and cons of reasonably available alternatives.
The appropriate detail depends on such factors as the importance of the decision,
how much advice the client wants, what the client has already learned and consid-
ered, and the time available for deliberation.").
130 See Bonnie, supra note 33, at 571-72, 586; Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note
33, at 1597-98.
131 Under McKaskle, a trial court may impose standby counsel to assist a pro se
defendant in procedural matters over his objection. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
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gather information to understand the situation, brainstorm alterna-
tive responses, evaluate these alternatives, and select a responsive strat-
egy for addressing the problem. He will need to make decisions
extemporaneously, during the course of trial, often while an impa-
tient decisionmaker (the judge or jury) is waiting. Finally, a pro se
defendant must, unless assisted by standby counsel, translate his deci-
sions into courtroom-appropriate action.
In addition, a pro se defendant who proceeds to trial must, to
some degree, serve the important societal role of subjecting the state's
case to adversarial testing. The government and society have a strong
interest in a pro se defendant's ability and willingness to challenge the
state's case. To the extent a defendant is unable, because of mental
illness or disability, to make autonomous decisions or perform in a
minimal way as an adversary, the reliability and fairness of the pro-
ceeding, and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, will be at
risk.132
While Bonnie's analysis serves as an important conceptual precur-
sor to this project,133 to date no commentator has proposed a compre-
hensive competence standard to address the particular decisional
context of self-representation at trial. To discern the components of
an appropriate standard, it is useful to look to psychological theories
of problem solving.134 Self-representation, at its core, is an exercise in
problem solving, where the "problem" is the prosecution of one or
more criminal charges and the "solution" is the selection and imple-
mentation of an effective defense. To identify the range of decisional
168, 184 (1984). A pro se defendant does not have a constitutional right to the assis-
tance of standby counsel, however. See United States v. Bova, 350 F.3d 224, 226 (1st
Cir. 2003); McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir. 1985).
132 See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176-77 (2008).
133 See supra text accompanying note 54.
134 The law has relied on psychological insight into problem solving in a variety of
contexts. The American Bar Association has identified problem solving as essential to
effective lawyering. See Josiah M. Daniel, III, A Proposed Definition of the Term "Lawyer-
ing, "101 LAW LIBR. J. 207, 213-14 (2009) (reporting that an American Bar Associa-
tion task force, created to study and report on how to improve the process by which
law students are prepared for practice, defined '"fundamental lawyering skills essen-
tial for competent representation' as problem solving, legal analysis, legal research,
factual investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation, and litigation and
alternate dispute resolution" (quoting TASK FORCE ON LAw SCH. & THE PROFESSION,
AM. BAR ASS'N, LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 135 (1992))). Scholars are in
accord. See, e.g., Linda Morton, A New Approach to Health Care ADPR" Training Law Stu-
dents to Be Problem Solvers in the Health Care Context, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 970-71
(2005); Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: "The Problem" in
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 867-68 (2008).
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abilities potentially necessary for self-representation, our initial
inquiry should focus on disaggregating the problem-solving process.
Of the many problem-solving theories propounded, one in partic-
ular-social problem-solving theory-is notable for its comprehen-
siveness and applicability to real-life disputes. Developed by
Professors Marvin R. Goldfried and Thomas D'Zurilla' 35 and refined
by D'Zurilla and Professor Arthur M. Nezu,1 36 the model is prescrip-
tive, meaning that it represents a model of effective or successful prob-
lem solving derived from clinical judgment and research. 13 7 Social
problem solving is defined as the self-directed cognitive, behavioral,
and affective process by which an individual attempts to identify effec-
tive solutions for specific problems encountered in the natural envi-
ronment. 138 D'Zurilla and his colleagues define a problem as "any life
situation or task (present or anticipated) that demands a response for
adaptive functioning but no effective response is immediately appar-
ent or available to the person or people confronted with the situation
because of the presence of one or more obstacles."139 Obstacles may
include novelty, ambiguity, deficiency of performance skills, or lack of
resources.140 A problem is thus a particular person-environment rela-
tionship marked by a perceived imbalance between demands and
adaptive response availability. 141
By definition, social problem-solving theory applies to problems
in everyday life. Social problem solving is intended to encompass
impersonal problems such as insufficient finances, personal or
intrapersonal problems such as cognitive or health problems, inter-
personal problems such as marital conflicts, and broader community
135 See Anderer, supra note 23, at 42 (citing Marvin R. Goldfried & Thomas J.
D'Zurilla, A Behavioral-Analytic Model for Assessing Competence, in 1 CURRENT TOPICS IN
CLINICAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 151 (Charles D. Spielberger ed., 1969)); see
also Thomas J. D'Zurilla & Marvin R. Goldfried, Problem Solving and Behavior Modifica-
tion, 78J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 107 (1971) (outlining "real life" scenarios for imple-
mentation of their theory as well as techniques for problem-solving enhancement).
136 See THOMAS J. D'ZURILLA & ARTHUR M. NEZU, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY (2d
ed. 1999); Thomas J. D'Zurilla & Arthur Nezu, Social Problem Solving in Adults, in 1
ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH AND THERAPY 201 (Philip C. Kendall
ed., 1982).
137 See ARTHUR M. NEZU ET AL., PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION 32
(1989).
138 See D'ZuRiLLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 10; D'Zurilla et al., supra note 24, at
11, 12.
139 D'Zurilla et al., supra note 24, at 12; see D'ZURILLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at
11.
140 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 24, at 13.
141 See D'ZuRILLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 12.
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and social problems such as crime and racial discrimination.1 42 Thus,
social problem-solving theory should be relevant in analyzing the deci-
sionmaking process of a pro se defendant in a criminal trial.
Social problem-solving theory conceives of everyday problem solv-
ing as consisting of a motivational component called problem orienta-
tion and four goal-directed problem-solving skills. 143 These skills
include problem definition and formulation, generation of alternative
solutions, decisionmaking, and solution implementation. 144 Each
process or skill makes a distinct contribution while interacting with
and affecting the efficacy of the other problem-solving components.
To evaluate the importance of these abilities for self-representation,
this Part subjects problem-solving components to scrutiny through the
normative lens outlined in Part II.
Two points are important to emphasize at the outset. First, to
accord due respect for a defendant's autonomy, a court should find a
defendant incompetent only if his inability to satisfy a functional com-
ponent of a representational competence standard stems from a
mental illness or disability. Including a causation element in a repre-
sentational competence standard may be constitutionally compelled
and, anyway, should help prevent courts from depriving individuals of
their right to represent themselves merely because their choices are
odd or different. This threshold requirement is explored in Part IV.
Second, any proposed competence standard should be validated
by research findings before adoption by a court. A court should not
require a pro se defendant to possess any particular cognitive or
behavioral ability unless empirical evidence demonstrates that incom-
petent defendants actually differ from competent defendants along
that dimension. 145 In addition, research should indicate whether that
difference creates an unacceptable risk of unreliability or unfair-
ness.146 Caution is especially appropriate when considering the inclu-
sion of decisionmaking abilities, because research demonstrates that
142 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 24, at 11.
143 See id. at 14.
144 See id. Social problem-solving theory also includes the skill of solution verifica-
tion. See id. For reasons outlined in footnote 331, this Article will not consider to any
great length the applicability of solution verification for representational
competence.
145 See Bonnie, supra note 33, at 579 (stating that "data regarding the distribution
of abilities relating to 'rational decisionmaking' in the general population of criminal
defendants, and regarding the relation between these abilities and mental disorder,"
should inform competence standards for varying decisional contexts when a defen-
dant disagrees with his attorney, but that systematic research on these issues has only
recently begun); Anderer, supra note 23, at 39, 73.
146 See Anderer, supra note 23, at 39, 73.
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the average person (much less the average criminal defendant seeking
to proceed pro se) may not employ optimal decisionmaking strate-
gies. 147 Whether a defendant seeking to proceed pro se differs from
the majority of pro se criminal defendants in his capacity for solving
problems, how he differs, and whether those differences are of a kind
and magnitude justifying intervention are questions worthy of study
and are beyond the scope of this paper.148
A. Problem Orientation
Problem orientation, the first domain of social problem solving,
is a motivational process that involves the general cognitive, behav-
ioral, and affective response of an individual when confronted with a
specific problem.1 49 Problem orientation reflects an individual's
beliefs, opinions, and feelings about problems and his own problem-
solving ability. 150 It is a product primarily of an individual's previous
experience with problems and problem solving. 151 The cognitive
component of problem orientation comprehends a sensitivity to rec-
ognize problems when they occur, beliefs about the causes of
problems, appraisal of problems' significance for one's well-being,
personal control expectancies, and commitments of time and energy
to problem solving.152 The behavioral component encompasses ten-
dencies to confront or avoid problems. 153 The affective component of
problem orientation consists of emotional states associated with prob-
lematic situations, including negative affect (e.g., anger, anxiety,
depression) and positive affect (e.g., hope, eagerness, excitement) .154
Problem orientation has five components: problem perception, prob-
lem attribution, approach/avoidance style, problem appraisal, and
time/effort commitment. 55 While it may be inappropriate to include
147 See Barry Edelstein, Challenges in the Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity, 14 J.
AGING STUD. 423, 428 (2000). See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (establishing the
widespread use of heuristics, or mental shortcuts, in making decisions).
148 See Anderer, supra note 23, at 39.
149 See Arthur M. Nezu & Christine Maguth Nezu, Problem Solving Therapy, 11 J.
PSYCHOTHERAPY INTEGRATION 187, 188 (2001).
150 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 24, at 14.
151 See Thomas J. D'Zurilla & Arthur M. Nezu, Development and Preliminary Evalua-
tion of the Social Problem-Solving Inventory, 2 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 156, 157 (1990).
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 This description of the five dimensions of problem orientation is a composite
and reformulation of categories identified by D'Zurilla and Nezu. See D'ZumuA &
NEZU, supra note 136, at 19-22 (defining problem orientation as consisting of prob-
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all of these components in a representational competence standard,
the standard should encompass those elements essential to a defen-
dant's autonomy and the reliability and actual and apparent fairness
of a conviction.
From a normative standpoint, three aspects of problem orienta-
tion are appropriate and important to include in a representational
competence standard. First, a defendant should possess some degree
of problem perception, or the ability to recognize the presence of a
problem or decision point.156 If a defendant is unable to recognize a
decision point, then his reaction at that moment cannot stand for a
deliberate exercise of autonomous decisionmaking. In the context of
self-representation, a defendant should be capable, to the extent he
possesses necessary procedural and evidentiary knowledge (an impor-
tant caveat), of recognizing points at trial at which he could advance
his defense. Faretta mandates that a defendant's lack of procedural
knowledge is irrelevant to his competence to represent himself.157 In
reality, however, a defendant's ability to recognize points at which he
can act at trial-as well as to generate alternatives at those decision
points-will be constrained by a lack of procedural or evidentiary
knowledge. Under the mantle of Faretta, courts should not require a
defendant to recognize decision points that are obvious only to per-
sons familiar with the minutiae of evidentiary or procedural rules.
158
But a defendant should be capable of recognizing common decision
points at trial, at a macro level, of which he has been informed by a
judge, standby counsel, or an evaluating mental health professional.
For instance, a defendant should not be permitted to represent him-
self if he lacks an ability to comprehend, if introduced to the concept,
that he can object to the introduction of the state's evidence during
its case-in-chief. An inability to recognize that the state's presentation
lem perception, problem attribution, perceived control, problem appraisal, and
time/effort commitment); D'Zurilla & Nezu, supra note 136, at 206 (defining an indi-
vidual's "problem-solving set" as consisting of problem perception, acceptance of the
view that problems are inevitable and that problem solving is a viable means of coping
with them, perceived control, and "the set to 'stop and think' when confronted with a
problem instead of responding 'automatically' with habits based on previous experi-
ence in similar situations").
156 See D'ZuRiuA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 20.
157 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 836 (1975).
158 For instance, a court should not expect a pro se defendant to be able to recog-
nize that the state's introduction of hearsay presents a decision point as it would
under Federal Rule of Evidence 802. Similarly, a test for problem orientation should
not require a pro se defendant to be capable of recognizing that he could potentially
object to the state's introduction of an unauthenticated written record as he could
under Federal Rule of Evidence 901.
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of compelling evidence is a problem that may be addressed, in part,
during the presentation of its case suggests that the defendant's
silence at that time would evince a lack of meaningful autonomy and
pose too great a threat to the reliability and fairness of the proceed-
ing. Evidence suggests that a person's tendency to recognize
problems is a stable trait that remains fairly consistent across situa-
tions.159 To move beyond the constraining effect of a lack of techni-
cal knowledge, evaluators may wish to test a defendant's ability to
perceive decision points by using nonlegal, familiar, everyday
hypotheticals.
Second, a defendant should be capable of ascribing a problem to
a rational, nondelusional source. 160 If a defendant is unable to
engage in a reality-based search for the cause of a stressful situation,
then he will be incapable of accurately appraising the problem and
setting realistic goals for remedying the situation. 161 A court should
hold a defendant incompetent to represent himself if he attributes the
underlying offense or the origin of the prosecution to a source that is
impossible, either absolutely or as to the individual. To demonstrate
the capacity for rational problem attribution, I suggest that a defen-
dant seeking to represent himself need only be able to identify a plau-
sible source of the prosecution. 162 All potentially plausible rationales
should suffice, including those that seem paranoid but conceivably
could enjoy evidentiary support. This is, admittedly, a low bar and
likely will serve to disqualify from self-representation only those whose
perceptions of reality are severely impaired by mental illness. 163
159 See Nezu & Nezu, supra note 149, at 188.
160 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 20; see also Terry A. Maroney, Emo-
tional Competence, "Rational Understanding," and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CuM. L.
REV. 1375, 1394-96 (2006) (discussing the importance, for adjudicative competence,
of an accurate perception of reality).
161 See generally Maroney, supra note 160, at 1394-96 (discussing case law that finds
inadequacies in defendants' powers of "perception and understanding" stemming
from fixed, delusional beliefs).
162 For discussion of a similar standard proposed in the context of decisionmak-
ing, see notes 270-87 and accompanying text.
163 One could argue that a defendant, to establish that he is capable of rational
problem attribution, should be able to identify a reason for the prosecution that is
actually supported by some evidence. Cf Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment,
69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 962-65 (1991) (defining a "delusion" as a belief unsupported by
evidence). Research suggests, however, that most defendants charged with an offense
actually committed the offense or a related one. See Hashimoto, supra note 111, at
452 (concluding on the strength of an empirical study of felony defendants that less
than one percent of criminal defendants represented by counsel are acquitted at
trial); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem ?, 2006 Wis.
L. REv. 739, 807 ("Yet in the end.., the vast majority of defendants plead guilty or, if
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For instance, a defendant could demonstrate adequate powers of
problem attribution by explaining his involvement in the incident
underlying an offense as a misunderstanding or his having been
framed up by the police.164 While perhaps improbable, these expla-
nations would not be impossible or delusional on their face, and
therefore should suffice to establish adequate powers of problem attri-
bution. A defendant should be found incompetent to represent him-
self, however, if he explains the prosecution as a manifestation of a
spirit-lord's revenge for sins in a past life. While to some extent all
things are possible, this explanation would be incapable of evidentiary
support and should, assuming that the belief stems from mental ill-
ness or disability, disqualify the defendant from self-representation.
For this reason, Brian David Mitchell, the individual who abducted
Salt Lake City teenager Elizabeth Smart, should have been found
incompetent to represent himself, had he been competent to stand
trial.165 Mitchell believed that God had ordained his prosecution,
conviction, and imprisonment to trigger a personal battle with the
Antichrist. 166 Such delusional beliefs about the source of a prosecu-
tion would color every subsequent stage of the defendant's decision-
making process at trial and would render the proceeding, in essence,
a farce.
Third, a defendant's approach/avoidance style should be one in
which he possesses a willingness to tackle problems. This element
implicates the defendant's personal control beliefs, or beliefs about
his ability to address problems adequately.167 If a defendant believes
himself incapable of solving problems and thus persistently avoids and
evades decision points, then he will be incapable of making the host
they go to trial, are convicted."). We do not obligate defendants to admit to their
crimes and actually privilege their right not to confess. Imposing a duty of candor as
to the basis of a prosecution at the stage of competence evaluation is inappropriate.
Rather, while an imperfect proxy, we should assume a defendant sufficiently capable
of rational problem attribution if he is able to identify a plausible cause-one that
could enjoy evidentiary support-for the prosecution.
164 As this example indicates, my proposed test for problem attribution involves
ensuring that a defendant does not attribute the prosecution to a clearly delusional
source, as opposed to confirming his ability to identify accurately the likely basis of
the prosecution.
165 See Maroney, supra note 160, at 1396 (discussing Findings and Conclusions Re:
Defendant's Competency to Proceed to Trial, Utah v. Mitchell, No. 031901884 (3d
Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah July 26, 2005)). Mitchell was ultimately found incompetent to
stand trial. Id.
166 See id. (discussing Findings and Conclusions Re: Defendant's Competency to
Proceed to Trial, Mitchell, No. 031901884),
167 See D'ZuRIU.L & NEZU, supra note 136, at 21.
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of decisions (often in quick succession) that trial demands. For the
defendant who opts to go to trial, an unwillingness to challenge the
prosecution's case because of mental illness or disability may signal an
inadequate approach/avoidance style. 168
A familiar example of a defendant unwilling to attend to the
problem of prosecution is Richard Moran, the defendant in Godinez v.
Moran.1 69 Moran was charged with three counts of capital murder. 170
Originally, he pleaded not guilty with the assistance of counsel. 171
Two psychiatrists appointed to assess Moran's competence observed
that, while he was competent to stand trial, Moran was "very
depressed"'172 and that, "because he is expressing and feeling consid-
erable remorse and guilt, [he] may be inclined to exert less effort
towards his own defense."' 173 Several months later, Moran discharged
his attorneys and pleaded guilty to three counts of capital murder.174
He explained that "he wished to represent himself because he
opposed all efforts to mount a defense" and wanted to prevent the
presentation of all mitigating evidence at the capital sentencing pro-
ceeding.' 75 Moran later testified that, at the time, "I guess I really
didn't care about anything .... I wasn't very concerned about any-
thing that was going on . .. as far as the proceedings and everything
were going."' 76 After waiving his right to counsel, Moran "presented
no defense, called no witness, and offered no mitigating evidence on
his own behalf."' 77 He was sentenced to death. 78 In essence, this
"self-destructive" orientation left Moran "helpless to defend him-
self,"'179 and he "volunteered himself for execution."'180 A complete
unwillingness to contest charges because of depression or another dis-
abling mental condition poses a severe threat to the reliability of a
168 It should be observed, however, that a defendant need not present a defense at
trial. If a defendant believes that the state lacks sufficient evidence to convict, he may
choose to rest after the state's case. See FED. R. CaM. P. 29(a).
169 509 U.S. 389 (1993). For a thoughtful discussion of this case in a similar con-
text, see Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at 1606-08.
170 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 391.
171 See id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 410 (quoting Dr. William D. O'Gorman).
173 Id. at 409-10 (quoting Dr. Jack A. Jurasky).
174 Id. at 410.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 410-11 (alterations in original) (quoting Moran).
177 Id. at 412.
178 Id. at 393 (majority opinion).
179 Id. at 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 416.
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conviction, undermines the appearance of fairness of the proceeding,
and should result in a finding of representational incompetence.' 8I
Professors Christopher Slobogin and Amy Mashburn have pro-
posed a test for decisional competence that includes a similar voli-
tional element.182 They advocate that competence to waive the right
to counsel should include "basic self-regard," defined as "a willingness
to exercise autonomy."1 83 A "willingness to consider alternative scena-
rios" 18 4 or "alternative reasons"' 8 5 in a decisional context will satisfy
this volitional element. Slobogin and Mashburn have also described
basic self-regard as a "willing[ness] to consider relevant informa-
tion."186 Basic self-regard, according to these scholars, demonstrates
that a defendant has engaged in "a deliberative thought process" for a
particular decision.18 7 In their words, the test "does not evaluate the
181 The analysis in this Article does not address the competence of unrepresented
defendants who plead guilty. Given the similarities in capital sentencing proceedings
and trial, however, the representational competence standard proposed here may be
appropriate for that context as well.
182 See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at 1584. Several commentators have
opined on the importance of the relationship between motivation and competence.
See William M. Altman et al., Autonomy, Competence, and Informed Consent in Long Term
Care: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1671, 1686 (1992) (highlight-
ing the importance of motivation in psychological literature and suggesting that com-
petence should take into account a person's lack of "motivation to participate
meaningfully" in medical care decisions); Ian Freckelton, Rationality and Flexibility in
Assessment of Fitness to Stand Tria 19 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 39, 53 (1996) (noting that
certain psychiatric conditions may result in apathy, "apparent disinterest" in one's
own fate, and an unpreparedness to communicate with legal representatives, and thus
ultimately strike at the heart of an accused's ability to participate in the trial process);
Maroney, supra note 160, at 1404, 1409-11, 1413-15 (discussing the importance of
emotion to motivation in the context of adjudicative competence); see also Bonnie, A
Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 50, at 297 n.32 (referencing possible inclusion of a
motivational component for competence to stand trial).
183 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE 195 (2006).
184 See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at 1598.
185 Id. at 1584.
186 See id. at 1586, 1601, 1606.
187 Id. at 1598. Elsewhere, Slobogin has argued that a defendant should be per-
mitted to proceed pro se so long as he can give nondelusional, self-regarding reasons
for the waiver of representation. See Slobogin, supra note 53, at 402-03. If a defen-
dant is decisionally competent to waive his right to counsel, Slobogin argues, courts
should not question his competence to control and conduct a defense. See id. I
respectfully disagree with this position. As Slobogin recognizes, one established char-
acteristic of some forms of mental illness is that a person may be delusional about
some subjects and completely lucid as to others. See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra
note 33, at 1603; see also StephenJ. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analy-
sis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 573 (1977) ("It is a striking clinical
commonplace that crazy persons behave normally a great deal of the time and in
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premises of the ultimate decision, nor does it require inquiry into the
'rationality' of the reasoning process; it only requires that such a pro-
cess took place."' 88
The proposal articulated in this Article is slightly different. A will-
ingness to attend to problems does not necessarily indicate an intent
to entertain alternative solutions or even to engage in a deliberative
thought process. For instance, a defendant who believes the prosecu-
tion's case is, at its core, a case of mistaken identity may be unwilling
to ponder the benefits and disadvantages of his chosen defense or to
consider mounting an alternative one. Yet he may be committed to
addressing the problem of the prosecution by contesting the govern-
ment's case. It is this willingness to challenge the prosecution's case
that lies at the heart of the volitional element of this proposal. 18 9
Two elements of problem orientation, as defined by social prob-
lem-solving theory, are too subjective for inclusion in a representa-
tional competence standard. Problem appraisal involves the ability to
appraise the significance of a problem for one's well-being.' 90 The
degree to which an individual feels threatened by a problem, however,
will vary by the individual's values and personality. 191 It would there-
fore be difficult for an evaluator to find, with certainty, that an individ-
ual was over- or underreacting to a given problem. Indeed, such a
finding would likely largely reflect the values and subjectivejudgments
of the evaluator. Similarly, the element of time/effort commitment
involves an individual's willingness to commit a certain amount of
time or effort to solving a problem. 192 This element, too, will vary
many ways. Even when they are in the midst of a period of crazy behavior, much of
their behavior will be normal."); Singer, supra note 95, at 643-44 (illustrating the ways
in which an individual may be incompetent in one area, but competent in all or many
others); Winick, supra note 64, at 1774-75 & nn.274-75. Just because a defendant is
able to articulate a rational reason for dismissing counsel (such as the heavy workload
of public defenders) does not mean that he will be able tojustify his defense with a
plausible reason.
188 Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at 1603.
189 In application, the difference between "positive problem orientation" and
"basic self-regard" standards may be a distinction without a difference. In analyzing
the Godinez case under their standard, Slobogin and Mashburn find that Moran
seemed to lack basic self-regard because "his reasoning appeared to represent a com-
plete abdication of autonomy." Id. at 1608. Recently, Slobogin has recognized that
"an individual who fails to contest the state's claims in a capital case will often lack, at
the least, basic self-regard." Slobogin, supra note 53, at 399-410. In situations such as
that in Godinez, the defendant would fail to demonstrate positive problem orientation,
also leading to a finding of representational incompetence.
190 See D'ZuiLLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 20.
191 Accord Anderer, supra note 23, at 59.
192 See D'ZuRiLLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 21.
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according to the values and personality characteristics of individual
defendants. Therefore, representational competence should not
require a defendant to possess an ability to appraise problems or a
willingness to allocate a particular amount of time or effort to solving
them.
In summary, three elements of problem orientation-problem
perception, rational problem attribution, and a willingness to tackle
problems-may be essential predicates to autonomy and the reliability
and fairness of a criminal adjudication. If an individual is unable to
recognize the existence of a problem, unable to attribute it to a
rational source, or unwilling to attend to it because of a mental illness
or disability, then the individual's response at that decision point will
not be indicative of meaningful autonomy. In addition, self-represen-
tation will not subject the state's case to adversarial testing if the
defendant lacks these abilities. Evidence suggests that one's problem
orientation may facilitate or hinder later problem-solving activities, 193
so possession of the capabilities encompassed by problem orientation
is likely critical for arriving at sound decisions within the context of a
criminal trial. The relevance and importance of these capabilities for
autonomous decisionmaking and a reliable and fair adjudication sug-
gest that courts should include these three abilities in a representa-
tional competence standard.
B. Problem Definition and Formulation
The second domain of social problem solving involves the
rational application of four problem-solving skills, designed to maxi-
mize the probability of identifying an effective solution to a prob-
lem. 194 These skills include (a) problem definition and formulation,
(b) generation of alternative solutions, (c) decisionmaking, and (d)
solution implementation.1 9 5 Goldfried, D'Zurilla, and Nezu concep-
tualize these skills as goal-directed tasks.196 While serving unique
functions, the tasks are linked in the sense that the successful comple-
tion of one step in the problem-solving process enables the effective
193 See Arthur M. Nezu & Christine M. Nezu, Toward a Problem-Solving Formulation
of Psychotherapy and Clinical Decision Making, in CLINICAL DECISION MAKING IN BEHAVIOR
T4ERAPY 35, 41 (Arthur M. Nezu & Christine M. Nezu eds., 1989). An individual's
problem orientation may influence his appraisal of problems, his initiation of prob-
lem-solving activities, the efficiency of problem solving, and the amount of time and
effort he is willing to expend to cope with obstacles. See D'Zurilla & Nezu, supra note
151, at 156-57.
194 See D'ZuILLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 22.
195 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 25, at 14.
196 See D'ZuiLLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 22.
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application of the next skill. 197 While these skills are presented in a
sequential fashion, effective problem solving in practice often involves
continual and reciprocal movement between tasks before an individ-
ual implements an effective solution. 198
The first stage of the problem-solving process is problem defini-
tion and formulation. Problems in the real world are often "messy,"
meaning that they are vague and associated with irrelevant cues, inac-
curate information, and unclear goals.1 99 Of primary importance at
the problem formulation stage, according to social problem-solving
theory, is to gather relevant information about how and why a situa-
tion is troubling or why action is necessary. 20 0 The problem-solver
should be capable of distinguishing between relevant and wildly irrele-
vant information. 20 1 He should be able to use relevant information to
comprehend the nature of the problem, formulate goals, and (ide-
ally) identify any obstacles that may stand in the way of achieving
those goals such as deficits in information or ability.20 2 A problem-
solver's conception of a problem will affect his goals for responding to
the situation, his generation of alternative solutions, and his valuation
of those alternatives.203 Research demonstrates that a well-defined
problem enhances the effectiveness of the decisionmaking process. 20 4
Problem formulation is an essential component of all decisions
inherent in self-representation, but it may be most critical, from the
standpoint of the reliability and apparent fairness of an adjudication,
to the process of formulating a defense. 20 5 To satisfy minimal stan-
dards of reliability, a defendant should be capable of selecting and
constructing his defense in response to the government's case. Assess-
ing the "problem" of a prosecution prior to trial involves gathering
197 See generally id. at 33 (discussing the implications of a well-defined problem and
realistic goals for subsequent stages of the problem-solving process).
198 See id. at 34; Nezu & Nezu, supra note 193, at 40.
199 See D'ZuRiLLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 23.
200 See id.
201 See Nezu & Nezu, supra note 193, at 48.
202 See D'ZuRiLLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 24-25.
203 See id. at 26. For an assessment of the importance of problem definition in the
context of formulating public policy, see Jeffrey Barnes, The Continuing Debate About
'Plain Language' Legislation: A Law Reform Conundrum, 27 STATuTE L. REV. 83,
89 (2006), which states, "Problem formulation is probably the most critical point in
the policy-making process. It is so important because it largely determines the goals,
which in turn influence the means for achieving them."
204 See Nezu & Nezu, supra note 193, at 47.
205 Other critical decisions may include which witnesses to call and what lines of
cross-examination to pursue with hostile witnesses. See Freckelton, supra note 182, at
50-51.
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information on the government's likely prosecution theory and assess-
ing the likely evidence to be introduced against the defendant. 20 6 To
this end, a criminal defendant should be capable of understanding
the elements of the charged offense, identifying facts (including phys-
ical evidence and likely witness testimony) helpful to the state, and
roughly evaluating the significance of that evidence to the govern-
ment's case. As the trial unfolds, the defendant should be able to
comprehend the course of the proceedings and the substantial effect
of the government's evidence. 20 7 He should be able to examine the
government's case and discern potential deficiencies in the evidence.
Finally, he should be capable of identifying favorable evidence and
understanding its legal relevance. Some of these abilities-in particu-
lar, the abilities to understand the elements of the offense and to
identify favorable, relevant evidence-are already captured by the
Dusky competence standard for standing trial and Bonnie's founda-
tional concept of competence to assist counsel.
208
It is important to stress that there will be no one correct defini-
tion of a defendant's "problem" in relation to his prosecution. As a
preliminary matter, much of the information gathered prior to trial
will be speculative. The defendant will know the offense with which
he is charged and should have a copy of the complaint, which likely
206 Leonard L. Riskin and Nancy A. Welsh have defined the way parties typically
conceptualize the "problem" in civil litigation as determining the "applicable law, ...
the legally relevant facts, and how... they mesh." Riskin & Welsh, supra note 134, at
867-68. These authors argue that mediation offers the opportunity to define the
'problem" in a lawsuit more broadly so that the focus of the case can be on addressing
the parties' underlying interests. See id. at 904. For additional information on prob-
lem definition within the context of mediation, see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &JOsEPH
P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 84-99 (1994); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 134,
at 884-85; Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Tech-
niques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 22 (1996).
207 See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at 1591 (asserting that understanding
"the nature of the state's evidence and the nature of his own" is essential to under-
standing the significance of a decision to proceed without counsel). For an interna-
tional perspective, see Freckelton, supra note 182, at 44-45, describing the common
law standard in Australia for fitness to stand trial without counsel as including a defen-
dant's ability to "follow the course of proceedings so as to understand what is going on in
court in a general sense, though he need not, of course, understand the purpose of
all the various court formalities"; to understand "the substantial effect of any evidence that
may be given against him"; and to "have sufficient capacity to be able to decide what defence
he will rely upon." (quoting R v Presser [1958] VR 45, 48 (Ausfi.)).
208 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); Bonnie, supra note 33, at
554 & nn.62-63; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) ("It has long
been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity
to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.").
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will include only "an extremely truncated description of the criminal
conduct."20 9 He may not, however, be entitled to a copy of the police
report210 or a list of prosecution witnesses.21' More generally, framing
a problem is a subjective act, reflecting the values and priorities of an
individual problem-solver. As Jeffrey Barnes has observed in the con-
text of public policy:
[P] roblems are "mental constructs, abstractions from reality shaped
by our values, perceptions, and interests"; in other words, they are
subjectively perceived. . . . And because people are differently
placed in society, a problem is not the same to all interested parties;
there will be as many definitions of the problem as there are inter-
ested parties.21 2
For instance, one defendant may conceptualize the feared result
of a prosecution as a possible term of imprisonment, while another
may be more concerned about safeguarding his reputation among his
cohorts. Therefore, any test of one's ability to frame or define a prob-
lem should not assess the accuracy of the ultimate problem definition,
but rather should evaluate one's ability (and proclivity) to gather
information about a problematic situation, distinguish relevant from
wildly irrelevant data, and use that information to define the problem
in light of one's goals and values.
209 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.1(c) (5th ed. 2009). For a
critique of modem pleadings as unduly narrowing the definition of problems in litiga-
tions, see Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. LJ. 727 (2005).
Professor Moffitt has observed that modem "[pileadings define problems in a way
that stands in stark contrast with researchers' best current understanding of problem-
solving practices." Id. at 729. While pleadings may appropriately frame a litigated
problem by focusing attention on claims and defenses, pleadings define problems in
ways that may discourage prudent and efficient settlement. Id. at 736-37. Moffitt has
explained the phenomenon in this way:
The process of drafting and receiving initial pleadings invites disputants to
frame disputes as binary clashes, to conceive of past events in absolute terms,
to base solutions solely on entitlements stemming from prior events, and to
filter out as irrelevant a vast body of information related to the circum-
stances underlying the dispute.
Id. at 737.
210 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 209, § 20.3(k). In most states a defendant will be
entitled to his written or recorded statement. See id. § 20.3(c).
211 Many states require pretrial disclosure of the prosecution's anticipated wit-
nesses beyond the disclosure required as to expert witnesses. See id. §§ 20.1(c),
20.3(h). Many of these states also require disclosure of those witnesses' written or
recorded statements. See id. § 20.3(b).
212 See Barnes, supra note 203, at 89-90 (quoting PETER BRiDcMAN & GLYN DAvis,
THE AusTRALLAN POLICY HANDBOOK 45 (3d ed. 2004)).
[VOL. 86:2
REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE
C. Generation of Alternatives
The second stage of the problem-solving process, after problem
definition and formulation, involves the generation of alternatives for
solving a problem. Social problem-solving theory posits that brain-
storming as many potential solutions to a problem as possible will
maximize the likelihood that the optimal solution will surface. 213 To
accomplish this goal, D'Zurilla and Goldfried stress three principles:
quantity, deferment of judgment, and variety of strategy/tactics. 214
The first principle is that quantity breeds quality, meaning that an
individual will produce more high quality ideas as he generates addi-
tional alternatives. 215 Deferment of judgment refers to the notion
that an individual should defer critical evaluation of alternatives until
the decisionmaking stage in order to produce the greatest number of
high quality ideas.216 Finally, the principle of strategic variety suggests
that a problem-solver should generate strategies for solving a problem
before brainstorming specific actions or tactics for accomplishing
each strategy.217
A representational competence standard should not require a
criminal defendant to employ optimal techniques for generating alter-
native solutions, but it probably should comprehend the basic ability
to generate more than one option in response to a given problem. By
definition, an individual cannot solve a problem without generating at
least one possible solution. It is also likely true that a person's ability
to generate an adequate response depends on his capacity for brain-
storming multiple options. In the context of a criminal trial, generat-
ing alternative approaches at a given decision point-whether when
deciding what defense to exert, how to build that defense, or how to
respond to a witness called by the state-is a function normally served
by counsel. Given the centrality of this process to problem solving in
general and criminal litigation in particular, it seems reasonable to
require a defendant seeking to represent himself at trial to possess the
213 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 28-29; D'Zurilla & Nezu, supra note
151, at 157; D'Zurilla et al., supra note 24, at 16; Nezu & Nezu, supra note 149, at 189.
214 See Thomas J. D'Zurilla & Arthur Nezu, A Study of the Generation-of-Alternatives
Process in Social Problem Solving, 4 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 67, 68 (1980). D'Zurilla
and his colleagues derived these principles from J.P. Guilford's divergent production
operation and Alex Osborn's method of brainstorming. See D'ZuRiLIA & NEZU, supra
note 136, at 28 (citingJ.P. GUILFORD, THE NATURE OF HuMAN INTELLIGENCE (1967);
Alex F. OSBORN, APPLIED IMAGINATION (3d ed. 1963)).
215 See D'ZuRILLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 28.
216 See id.
217 See D'Zurilla & Nezu, supra note 214, at 68. D'Zurilla and Nezu refer to this
principle as "strategy." Id.
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ability to generate alternative strategies for solving a problem at a
given decision point. One aspect of trial makes testing this ability
within the context of criminal adjudication troublesome, however.
The generation of strategic alternatives at trial will be informed
to a large extent by a defendant's store of legal, procedural, and evi-
dentiary knowledge. For instance, a defendant's ability to select a
defense responsive to the government's case will be constrained by
ignorance of possible defenses to the pending charges. Similarly, a
defendant's ability to exclude a piece of evidence will depend upon
his knowledge of evidentiary and procedural rules. The degree to
which a defendant is able to identify the optimal response to a prob-
lem presented by the state's case, then, is inextricably tied to his
knowledge of the legal framework that defines and bounds potential
litigation options.
Indeed, some courts appear to recognize the importance of a
defendant's technical knowledge for understanding the value of coun-
sel and for a defendant's ability to respond appropriately to the state's
case. When evaluating a defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver
and his competence to proceed pro se, some courts inquire into a
defendant's legal or procedural knowledge directly. 218 Others ask
about a defendant's involvement in previous criminal trials, his prior
representation by counsel, and any prior self-representation as a proxy
for ascertaining his familiarity with legal rules.219 Some courts will ask
a defendant about his understanding of the purpose of a particular
stage of trial and even discuss potential strategies for cross-examina-
tion.220 While these questions are certainly relevant to a defendant's
understanding of the risks and disadvantages of proceeding without
218 Both the Third and Sixth Circuits have suggested that trial courts model their
inquiry after that contained in the Bench Book for United States District Court Judges,
which includes questions on defendants' study of law and familiarity with the rules of
evidence and criminal procedure. See Julian A. Cook, III, Crumbs from the Master's
Table: The Supreme Court, Pro Se Defendants and the Federal Guilty Plea Process, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1895, 1933 (2006). For a copy of these guidelines, see United States v.
McDowell 814 F.2d 245 app. at 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987). Other circuits have adopted
similar guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 478 F.3d 1332, 1340 n.8 (lth Cir.
2007).
219 See, e.g., Evans, 478 F.3d at 1340 n.8 (asking about a defendant's previous expe-
rience with criminal trials); United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 846 (1st Cir.
1989) (stating that a trial court may consider a defendant's "involvement in previous
criminal trials [and] his representation by counsel before trial" in determining
whether he understands the risks of self-representation); McDoweU, 814 F.2d app. at
251 (including questions about a defendant's representation of himself or another
defendant).
220 See United States v. England, 507 F.3d 581, 585, 587 (7th Cir. 2007).
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counsel, they also bear upon a defendant's ability, without counsel, to
navigate complex evidentiary and procedural requirements at trial
and to generate appropriate options at certain trial stages.
221
Faretta makes clear, however, that a defendant's lack of procedu-
ral knowledge is irrelevant to his competence to represent himself.
222
There are two ways to reconcile the reality that technical knowledge is
critical to a defendant's generation of strategic options at trial with
Faretta's mandate that courts not penalize defendants wishing to dis-
pense with counsel for lacking technical knowledge. The first option
would be to test a defendant's capacity for generating alternatives
within the context of a nonlegal, familiar, everyday problem. For
instance, a court could pose a hypothetical about a defendant's car
breaking down while he was driving to work and ask him to brain-
storm several options for arriving at work on time.
223
The second approach would involve, in the interest of advancing
the fairness and reliability of an adjudication, supplying a defendant
with certain fundamental legal, procedural, and evidentiary informa-
tion. While "[a] court does not have to give the defendant a crash
course in criminal law or trial procedure before a defendant's waiver
of his right to counsel will be voluntary," 224 some courts have chosen
to advise a defendant of certain procedural rules before granting a
request to proceed pro se. For instance, some courts advise a defen-
dant wishing to represent himself that, if he chooses to testify, he must
ask questions to himself.2 25 Professor Myron Moskovitz has inter-
preted the Due Process Clause to require trial judges to read to pro se
defendants a list of trial rights. 226 The proposed list includes the
rights of access to legal materials, to pretrial discovery, to jury trial, to
ask questions to prospective jurors, to exercise challenges for cause
and a specified number of peremptory challenges, to present an open-
221 Cf id. at 587 ("This Court examines the background and experience of the
defendant merely to gauge whether he appreciated the gravity of his waiver, not in
the hopes of finding adequate legal training.").
222 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (stating that a defendant's
"technical legal knowledge ... [is] not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exer-
cise of the right to defend himself').
223 SeeJohnston, supra note 54, at 1651-52.
224 England, 507 F.3d at 586.
225 See, e.g., United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245 app. at 251-52 (6th Cir.
1987).
226 See Myron Moskovitz, Advising the Pro Se Defendant: The Trial Court's Duties
Under Faretta, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 329, 341 (2004); see also Slobogin, supra note 53, at
399-400 (arguing that the assumption that because "one is capable of understanding
the charges, the penalties, and the 'adversary process,' . . . then one can understand
the nature of self-representation.... is egregiously wrong").
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ing statement, to object to prosecution evidence on evidentiary
grounds, to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in compliance with
the rules of evidence, to subpoena witnesses for the defense, not to
testify, to testify with a warning that the prosecutor will have the right
to cross-examine, and to present a closing argument.227 All of this
information would be useful in helping a defendant brainstorm and
ultimately select appropriate ways to proceed at trial and would
increase the likelihood of a reliable verdict that appears fair to outside
observers.
Assuming that a defendant is supplied or already possesses knowl-
edge of potential defenses, it may be particularly important to the reli-
ability of an adjudication to establish a defendant's ability to
brainstorm relevant, responsive defenses. In assessing a defendant's
competence to represent himself, courts appear particularly con-
cerned about a defendant's ability to use relevant information to fash-
ion a response to the pending charges.228 In a plurality opinion, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that, to be valid, a waiver of
counsel "must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of
allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges
and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential
to a broad understanding of the whole matter."229 This language,
however, is not binding upon lower courts.230 While many courts
advise a defendant of possible defenses, 23 ' some do not.232 Given that
a defendant's ability to select a legally recognized defense is critical to
227 See Moskovitz, supra note 226, at 341.
228 See, e.g., People v. Burnett, 234 Cal. Rptr. 67, 76 (Ct. App. 1987) (characteriz-
ing the ability "to understand and use relevant information rationally in order to fash-
ion a response to the charges" as a basic skill relating to the presentation of a
defense), abrogated by People v. Hightower, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 40 (Ct. App. 1996).
229 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) (plurality opinion). This stan-
dard has been quoted approvingly in subsequent cases, though only as dicta. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 244 n.32 (1973).
230 See Brian H. Wright, Comment, The Formal Inquiry Approach: Balancing a Defen-
dant's Right to Proceed Pro Se with a Defendant's Right to Assistance of Counsel 76 MARQ. L.
REv. 785, 790-91 (1993).
231 See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 478 F.3d 1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 2007); Maynard
v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 677 (10th Cir. 2006); Shafer v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 637, 647,
649 (8th Cir. 2003).
232 SeeJohn M. Stevens, Waiver of Counsel in Pennsylvania: Constitutional Issues Facing
Criminal Defendants, Counsel, and Courts, 12 WIDENER L.J. 29, 40-50 (2003) (discussing
the variety among Pennsylvania courts' practices in providing information to defend-
ants seeking to waive the right to counsel); see also, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth,
830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that a valid waiver is possible merely if a
defendant is "aware of the nature of the charges against him, the possible penalties,
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ensuring a reliable verdict, courts should, as a matter of due process,
advise a defendant of possible defenses to pending charges. Because a
defendant need not present any defense at trial and may refuse to
consider any defense inconsistent with his understanding of the truth,
courts should assess the ability to identify-but not the actual intent to
pursue-relevant defenses. 233
In conclusion, a pro se defendant should possess the ability to
generate alternative solutions at decision points because this capacity
appears sufficiently critical to his ability to make meaningful choices
and to perform as a minimally effective adversary to the state. A
defendant's ability to brainstorm alternative responses to problems at
trial will depend upon his legal and technical knowledge. Therefore,
courts should consider supplying a defendant with technical knowl-
edge critical to his functioning at trial, including a list of potential
defenses to the pending charges. Alternatively, courts should con-
sider testing a defendant's ability to generate more than one potential
solution within a nonlegal, everyday, problem-solving context.
D. Decisionmaking
The third stage of problem solving-decisionmaking-involves
evaluating and comparing the costs and benefits of different solutions
in order to select the solution most likely to achieve one's goals. 234
The decisionmaking component of the D'Zurilla and Goldfried
model is based upon expected utility theory, in which "the expected
utility of a given alternative is a ... function of the value and likelihood
of predicted consequences." 23 5 Social problem-solving theory concep-
tualizes decisionmaking as a logical process through which a problem-
solver compares the costs and benefits of alternative solutions and
and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" (citing United States v.
Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 1983))).
233 See Hernandez-Alberto v. State, 889 So. 2d 721, 729 (Fla. 2004) ("The court
may not inquire further into whether the defendant could provide himself with a
substantively qualitative defense, for it is within the defendant's fights, if he or she so
chooses, to sit mute and mount no defense at all." (quoting State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d
248, 251 (Fla. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
234 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 24, at 16; Nezu & Nezu, supra note 149, at 189.
For an extended discussion of decisionmaking, see D'ZuiLLA & NEZU, supra note
136, at 29-31.
235 See Arthur Nezu & Thomas J. D'Zurilla, An Experimental Evaluation of the Deci-
sion-Making Process in Social Problem Solving, 3 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 269, 270
(1979) (citing C. WEST CHURCHMAN, PREDICTION AND OPTIMAL DECISIONS (1961); W.
Edwards et al., Emerging Technologies for Making Decisions, in 2 NEw DIRECTIONS IN PSY-
CHOLOcY 261 (T.M. Newcomb ed., 1962)).
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selects the solution with the greatest utility.23 6 The decisionmaker is
expected to identify the likely advantages and disadvantages flowing
from each alternative, quantify probabilities for and assign values to
each consequence, calculate the utility of each option,237 and then
compare the options. 238 A rational decisionmaker, under this theory,
will select for implementation the solution with the greatest expected
utility. 2
3 9
Evidence suggests, however, that few-if any-individuals actually
reach decisions in this manner. If most individuals do not utilize a
process of rational manipulation when making decisions, then this
ability must not be critical for meaningful autonomy or arriving at a
reliable or fair verdict. This section presents evidence of actual deci-
sionmaking and suggests a standard for reasoning that is both more
tolerant of individuals' differences and potentially sufficient to safe-
guard the values of autonomy, fairness, and reliability. In particular, I
argue that courts should require that a pro se defendant be capable of
identifying a minimally plausible rationale for a decision. Few ele-
ments of competence have generated more spirited disagreement,240
236 See D'Zurilla et al., supra note 24, at 16; Nezu & Nezu, supra note 149, at 189.
The "decisionmaking" component of social problem-solving theory resembles Profes-
sor Richard Bonnie's "reasoned choice" test. See Bonnie, supra note 33, at 575. Bon-
nie defines the ability to reason as the "capacity to use logical processes to compare
the benefits and risks of the decisional options." Id. Bonnie derived this standard
from that developed by Professors Thomas Grisso and Paul Appelbaum in the context
of medical decisionmaking. See id.
237 The anticipated utility of an alternative is a function of the value and likeli-
hood of predicted consequences. Nezu & D'Zurilla, supra note 235, at 270.
238 See D'ZuiLtuA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 29-30.
239 See id. at 30.
240 Compare Bonnie, supra note 33, at 571-72, 586 (advocating a "reasoned choice"
standard for waiver of counsel, which requires a defendant to be capable of expres-
sing a choice, understanding factual information, appreciating the significance of
that information for the defendant's own case, and rationally manipulating informa-
tion), with Saks, supra note 163, at 962-65 (advocating a sophisticated "understanding
and belief' view by which the patient may reach his own judgments regarding the
truth of information, so long as his beliefs are nondelusional-ruling out beliefs that
"plainly fail to do what they purport to do, that is, portray the world accurately" or
those for which there is no evidence), and Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at
1597-98 (advocating a "basic rationality and self-regard" standard for waiver of coun-
sel, which requires a defendant to be capable of expressing a preference, understand-
ing relevant information, providing nondelusional reasons for his decisions, and a
"willingness to exercise autonomy, which usually can be demonstrated by a willingness
to consider alternative scenarios"). Courts also impose widely different standards for
a defendant's ability to reason rationally. Compare State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848,
859-60 (Minn. 1976) (finding a defendant incompetent to waive his fight to counsel
in part because the defense he offered "was both irrational and not a legal defense"),
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and I acknowledge that my approach may not earn others' approval.
Yet I hope that this contribution adds to the debate and will generate
conversation on whether, and to what extent, representational compe-
tence should assess a defendant's ability to reason.
1. Differences in Individuals' Decisionmaking Styles
Requiring criminal defendants to demonstrate an ability to
manipulate information in a rational and deliberate manner runs
counter to evidence of actual decisionmaking. 241 Research reveals
that few individuals, if any, regularly engage in optimal decisionmak-
ing strategies.242 It would exceed most people's mental capacity (and
the time available for reaching a decision) to brainstorm all possible
alternatives, identify the risks and benefits associated with each alter-
native, assign a probability and value to each consequence, compute
each alternative's utility, compare the alternatives, and select the one
most likely to accomplish the individual's goals. The term "bounded
rationality" captures the limited capability to process large amounts of
information at a given point in time. 243 As a means to cope with
bounded rationality and to simplify complex decisional operations,
overruled by Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), with Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884,
886 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring that a defendant be capable of processing informa-
tion in a logically consistent manner).
241 See Edelstein, supra note 147, at 428 (describing research indicating that "many
individuals do not engage in a formal rational manipulation of the information
presented in decision-making evaluations"); see also Maroney, supra note 160, at 1397,
1427 (describing individuals' common reliance on cognitive heuristics and biases and
suggesting "flexible reasoning" as a more appropriate model for real-world decision-
making); Saks, supra note 163, at 958 ("Even generally effective decisionmakers who
clearly have the ability to form accurate beliefs misuse statistics, misunderstand
probabilities, and accord undue weight to vivid examples. They also may be affected
profoundly by irrational and unconscious factors." (footnote omitted)).
242 Citing the work of J.F. Yates and A.L. Patalano, Professor Jennifer Moye
describes three modes of decisionmaking that individuals may employ: analytic, rule-
based, and automatic. SeeJennifer Moye et al., Empirical Advances in the Assessment of
the Capacity to Consent to Medical Treatment: Clinical Interpretations and Research Needs, 26
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REv. 1054, 1065 (2006) (citing J. Frank Yates & Andrea L.
Patalano, Decision Making and Aging, in PROCESSING OF MEDICAL INFORMATION IN
AGING PATIENTS 31 (Denise C. Park et al. eds., 1999)). The analytic mode involves the
deliberate, sequential comparison of risks and benefits and requires the most time
and cognitive energy. See id. The rule-based or heuristic mode uses rules, developed
as individuals gain experiences with classes of decisions, as shortcuts in the decision-
making process. See id. The automatic mode operates without awareness and
requires little time and few cognitive resources. See id.
243 See Nezu & Nezu, supra note 198, at 17-18.
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humans employ heuristics, or mental shortcuts used consciously or
subconsciously.2 44
In their groundbreaking empirical work, Professors Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman demonstrated that individuals making deci-
sions under conditions of uncertainty utilize heuristics to reduce the
complexity of a decision to manageable proportions. 2 45 These cogni-
tive shortcuts are responsible for "severe and systematic errors" in
judgment. 246 Two common heuristics relevant to evaluating risks
inherent in decisionmaking include availability and representative-
ness.24 7 The availability heuristic involves individuals' tendency to
estimate the probability of an event by the ease with which instances
of that event can be recalled. 248 For example, a person might overesti-
mate his likelihood of acquittal using a self-defense strategy after read-
ing of a high-profile acquittal based on self-defense. The
representativeness heuristic, on the other hand, involves individuals'
tendency to mistake a resemblance for a causal relationship.2 49 Stated
differently, when a person faces an ambiguous choice, he tends to
choose the option most representative of a previous, known pattern,
without questioning whether that pattern has relevance to predicting
a future event.2 50 Thus, individuals tend to assign a higher probability
of occurrence to events brought to mind easily.25 1 For instance, if a
defendant ascribes a prior conviction to his counsel's "soft" cross-
examination of the victim, the pro se defendant might opt to conduct
a "hard" cross-examination of the victim in the instant case. In addi-
tion to utilizing heuristics, individuals often employ biased search
strategies and exhibit overconfidence and hindsight bias, which also
contribute to judgmental errors.252
244 SeeJohn E. Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A Pro-
posal to Limit Their Effects Without Changing the World, 85 NEB. L. REV. 15, 16 (2006);
Arthur M. Nezu & Christine M. Nezu, Clinical Prediction, Judgment, and Decision Making:
An Overview in CLNICAL DECISION MAKING IN BEHAVIOR THERAPY, supra note 193, at 9,
18-19.
245 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 147.
246 Id. at 1124.
247 See Montgomery, supra note 244, at 22; Nezu & Nezu, supra note 244, at 19.
248 See Nezu & Nezu, supra note 244, at 19.
249 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1051, 1086 (2000);
see also Nezu & Nezu, supra note 244, at 20-23 (discussing the representativeness
heuristic).
250 Montgomery, supra note 244, at 22-23.
251 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 147, at 1127.
252 See ARTHUR FREEMAN ET AL., CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 172 (2008) ("Biased search
strategies lead clinicians to falsely confirm their hypotheses about their clients' diagno-
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While the use of heuristics may lead to systematic errors of judg-
ment, these mental shortcuts also can contribute to accurate and effi-
cient decisionmaking. Research indicates that experts over time
develop complex heuristic and automatic decisional processes to
reach decisions that are effective but hard to explain to others.
25 3
The inability to articulate a large number of "rational reasons" to jus-
tify a decision may convey the misimpression that valid rationales do
not exist.2 54 Professor Jennifer Moye cautions that "[a]ssessment
approaches that assume explicit analytic-type processing may unfairly
jeopardize individuals who make decisions through more implicit
approaches."2 55 Thus, an individual may be an effective, "rational"
decisionmaker without utilizing the logical process that social prob-
lem-solving theory proscribes. In addition, other research suggests
that, even when individuals do engage in a deliberate processing of
the costs and benefits of alternative solutions, they are not accus-
tomed to recalling the factors that contributed to their decisions.
2 56
This research calls into question the validity of instruments that assess
the rationality of an individual's decisionmaking process.
25 7
For all of these reasons, it is inappropriate to require defendants,
in order to exercise their right to self-representation, to possess the
ability (or proclivity) to make a decision by comparing the potential
consequences of alternative solutions in a deliberate, logical,
probability-laden way. 258 Assuming that most adults are capable of
ses, case formulations, progress, receptiveness to treatment, or other hypotheses as a
result of only gathering or searching for information or only using search strategies,
instruments, or tools, that are consistent with one's way of thinking, and excluding or
disregarding search tools or information that could potentially disconfirm hypothe-
ses."); Ulrich Hoffrage, Overconfidence, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS 235 (Rcidiger F. Pohl
ed., 2004) (noting that "overconfidence occurs if our confidence in our judgements,
inferences, or predictions is too high when compared to the corresponding accu-
racy"); Montgomery, supra note 244, at 24 ("'Hindsight bias' causes an observer to
overestimate the predictability of an event when the observer already knows what hap-
pened."); Nezu & Nezu, supra note 244, at 25-28.
253 See Moye et al., supra note 242, at 1065.
254 See id.
255 See id. at 1072.
256 See Edelstein, supra note 147, at 428.
257 See Moye et al., supra note 242, at 1069-70.
258 See Edelstein, supra note 147, at 429 ("One might ask whether older adults
must be capable of rational decision making to be competent, if the average older
adult approaches decision making through rules rather than a rational consideration
of risks, benefits, and costs. Are our current standards unreasonably exclusionary?").
For this reason, the "reasoned choice" standard proposed by Bonnie also appears
inappropriate as a decisional competence standard. See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra
note 33, at 1603.
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autonomous decisionmaking, the fact that most do not appear to
employ a process of rational manipulation of information when mak-
ing a decision suggests that this ability is not requisite to autonomy.
For the same reason, this ability cannot be considered essential to the
reliability or fairness of a criminal trial. Furthermore, requiring the
ability to engage in a deliberate, calculation-intensive reasoning pro-
cess for pro se defendants, given the socioeconomic and educational
status typical of this population,259 may be especially unjust. Imposing
this requirement could, in effect, eliminate the constitutional right to
self-representation for a majority of criminal defendants. Instead,
courts should consider adopting a less stringent test for a defendant's
ability to make sound decisions in the context of self-representation at
trial. One possible standard would be to require an ability to articu-
late a plausible rationale, capable of-if not actually enjoying-evi-
dentiary support.
2. Identifying a Plausible Reason for a Decision
To select a more appropriate standard for assessing a defendant's
ability to reason in the context of self-representation, it is useful to
evaluate the importance of reasoning through our normative lens.
This Article posits that a defendant capable of autonomous decision-
making should be allowed to control his defense unless the self-repre-
sentation poses an impermissibly grave threat to the reliability or
actual or apparent fairness of the adjudication. To constitute a mean-
ingful expression of autonomy, a defendant's key decisions, such as
the selection of a defense, 260 should at a superficial level be tethered
to reality.261 Indeed, as others have argued, giving credence to grossly
259 See Shiv Narayan Persaud, Conceptualizations of Legalese in the Course of Due Pro-
cess, from Arrest to Plea Bargain: The Perspectives of the Disadvantaged Offenders, 31 N.C.
CENT. L. REv. 107, 115 n.37 (2009) ("Most convicted offenders sentenced to a term of
imprisonment are poor, uneducated and underemployed." (quoting MATrHEW B.
ROBINSON, JUsTIcE BLIND? 281 (3d ed. 2009))).
260 While it may be normatively optimal to require all of a defendant's decisions
relating to his representation to be justified by a plausible reason, subjecting each
decision to court scrutiny would be unworkable. The decision of which defense the-
ory, if any, to advance is so crucial to the apparent fairness and reliably of a resulting
conviction that it warrants consideration in a representational competence standard.
It may be that other decisions are so critical to the fairness or accuracy of the outcome
that they, too, should be evaluated when deciding whether or not a defendant is com-
petent to represent himself at trial. I do not speculate as to the identity of any addi-
tional crucial decisions here.
261 See Hashimoto, supra note 111, at 456 ("[I]f pro se defendants decide to
represent themselves because of delusions or irrationality related to mental illness, it
would appear that meaningful autonomy and free choice are not furthered by recog-
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irrational decisions would denigrate the very principle of auton-
omy.2 62 Delusional defendants who are disconnected from reality are
incapable of assessing relevant evidence and protecting themselves
from harm. 263 In the words of Professor Elyn Saks, such defendants
"have lost the ability to discern truth."264 Unable to recognize their
interests, they lack a cognizable autonomy interest in the context of
self-representation. 265 This insight suggests that a representational
competence standard should (at least) prevent persons incapable of
making decisions plausibly grounded in reality from controlling their
defenses.
The norms of promoting reliable and fair adjudications are also
advanced by disqualifying individuals disconnected from reality from
representing themselves. As discussed previously, a defendant's selec-
tion of a defense may be a decision particularly critical to the reliabil-
ity and fairness of an adjudication. 266 A defense unmoored from
reality is unlikely to subject the prosecution's case to adversarial test-
ing. In addition, a defendant's pursuit of such a defense would
threaten to create just the kind of humiliating spectacle that the
nizing the right of self-representation."); John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitu-
tion of Judgment: Ethics and the Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 AM. U. L. Rxv. 207,
211 (2008); Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at 1586; Winick, supra note 63, at
1771-72.
262 See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at 1594 (arguing that honoring rea-
sons devoid of sense or self-regard undermines the twin goals supporting a preference
for autonomy: "the goal of respecting people's true desires and beliefs and the goal of
acknowledging that doing so is an important value in our society").
263 See Saks, supra note 163, at 956 (characterizing "delusional beliefs" as those
that are "so patently false that those who hold them must have suffered a severe break-
down of their ability to assess evidence").
264 See id. at 961.
265 See King, supra note 261, at 211 ("In cases involving criminal defendants suffer-
ing serious mental impairment, the very reasoning behind the model of client-cen-
tered representation and client autonomy can fall apart, especially in cases involving
defendants who, although competent to stand trial, are 'decisionally incompetent'
and, therefore, unable meaningfully to assist in their own defenses." (footnotes omit-
ted)); Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at 1586.
266 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. Courts have expressed particular
concern about a mentally ill defendant's decision to advance a defense that is based
on delusions or is otherwise clearly implausible. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simpson,
689 N.E.2d 824, 829 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (labeling as "dramatically irrational" the
defendant's defense that "he was entitled to hammer a sleeping woman in the head,
as well as knife her, because of a pervasive conspiracy arrayed against him by multiple
forces, some only heard and unseen").
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Edwards Court suggested undermines the dignity of the accused and
begets the appearance of an unfair trial. 267
The difficult question, then, becomes what standard a court
should employ, as a prerequisite to self-representation, to assess a
defendant's ability to make rational decisions concerning the selec-
tion of a defense. In the interest of respecting a defendant's auton-
omy-and in recognition of a defendant's right to make poor choices
regarding his defense-the standard should be low. Faretta and its
progeny have made clear that autonomy, not reliability or fairness, is
the telos of the right to self-representation. 268 Because a defendant's
autonomy is paramount, it is preferable to err on the side of allowing
a potentially delusional defendant to control his defense than to
impose counsel on an unwilling, nondelusional defendant. It is
impossible, however, to craft a standard that functions perfectly to dis-
tinguish odd or unpopular beliefs made by persons capable of identi-
fying and advancing their interests from odd or unpopular beliefs
made by persons incapable of identifying or advancing their interests
due to mental illness or disability. 269
To honor the preference for autonomy, I suggest that a defen-
dant possesses adequate reasoning ability if he is capable of justifying
his selection of a defense with a single 270 reason that has a plausible
grounding in reality. 27 1 Justifications with a plausible grounding in
267 See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176-77 (2008) (leaving unclear whether
the defendant's chosen defense was delusional or not plausibly linked to reality); cf
id. at 181-82, 186 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the dignity interest protected by the
right of self-representation is the "dignity of being master of one's fate," not prevent-
ing "the defendant's making a fool of himself by presenting an amateurish or even
incoherent defense").
268 See Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 160 (2000); McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984) ("The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity
and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least
occasionally, be the accused's best possible defense."); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 834 (1975).
269 Cf Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lanyer Decisionmaking and
the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 515, 537-38 ("The most important
task for the legal standard of competency is to distinguish effectively between foolish,
socially deviant, risky, or simply 'crazy' choices made competently, and comparable
choices made incompetently. Although incompetent behavior may be restrained,
identical competent behavior may not." (footnote omitted)).
270 Under my proposed test, so long as a defendantjustifies a decision with a single
plausible reason-even if other, clearly delusional reasons are also offered-he would
possess adequate reasoning ability to represent himself at trial.
271 This standard is inspired by that offered by Professor Elyn Saks in the context
of medical treatment decisionmaking. See Saks, supra note 163, at 962-65. For a dis-
cussion of Saks's standard-and an explanation for why that standard should not be
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reality would include reasons enjoying a modicum of evidentiary sup-
port and those capable of evidentiary support in the world as we under-
stand it. In contrast to the requirement that a defendant demonstrate
a capacity for engaging in a logical, probability-laden decisionmaking
process, this standard would accommodate individuals' differing deci-
sionmaking styles. The standard would also respect variation in
defendants' beliefs, values, and preferences. It has the added benefit
of providing a fairly objective measure of plausibility, which would
serve to constrain courts' ability to find incompetent those decisions
that they simply believe to be unwise.
Examples may be useful to elucidate the contours of this pro-
posed test. Under this standard, a defendant would be competent to
represent himself if he articulates a reason supporting the selection of
his defense that, though refuted by all available evidence, is capable of
evidentiary support. For instance, a defendant charged with murder
would be found competent to represent himself in the following cir-
cumstance: the defendant wants to pursue a mistaken identity
defense, even though he can produce no evidence of an alibi, his fin-
gerprints were found on the gun that killed the victim, and several
eyewitnesses intend to testify that they saw the defendant pull the trig-
ger. He should be competent to represent himself because, while no
evidence (besides his possible testimony) actually supports his
defense, it is plausible that it could. It is possible that multiple eyewit-
nesses could be mistaken or lying.2 72 It is possible that the forensic
grafted without alteration into the context of self-representation-see infra notes
288-96 and accompanying text.
272 See Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliabil-
ity of Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) ("[D]ecades of research on
the topic have consistently found that mistaken identification is the leading cause of
wrongful convictions. In fact, it is so common that it practically rivals the sum of all
other errors that lead to wrongful convictions." (footnote omitted)); Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identifica-
tion Testimony, 41 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 1487, 1490 n.7 (2008) (citing studies demonstrat-
ing that hundreds of defendants have been wrongfully convicted on account of
eyewitness testimony or false confessions); see also William David Gross, Comment,
The Unfortunate Faith: A Solution to the Unwarranted Reliance upon Eyewitness Testimony, 5
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 307, 313 (1999) ("The preference for direct eyewitness testi-
mony, with its inherent degree of mistake, is the 'greatest single threat to the achieve-
ment of our ideal that no innocent man shall be punished.'" (quoting Carl McGowan,
Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. & MARv L. REV. 235, 238
(1970))). For an explanation of the psychological factors that contribute to the unre-
liability of eyewitness identification, see Douglas J. Narby et al., The Effects of Witness,
Target, and Substantial Factors on Eyewitness Identifications, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN
EvEwrrNvss IDENTIFICATION 23 (Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al. eds., 1996), and Aldert
2011]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
examiner who linked the defendant to the fingerprints erred.273 A
pro se defendant, lacking the skill and acumen of a trained attorney,
likely would be unable to establish such deficiencies in the state's evi-
dence. But, beyond the fact that the defendant's defense could actu-
ally represent an accurate account of what happened, our criminal
justice system generally does not sanction defendants for presenting
unsubstantiated, inaccurate, or frivolous defenses, 274  except in
Vrij, Psychological Factors in Eyewitness Testimony, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 105 (Amina
Memon et al. eds., 1998).
273 See Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identi-
fication, 95 J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1001-16 (2005) (discussing twenty-two
cases in which mistakes were discovered in fingerprint evidence); Simon A. Cole, The
Prevalence and Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction by Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 39, 41 (2006); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of
Fingerprint "Science" Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2002); Cynthia E.
Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted:Judicial Sanctions for Destruction of DNA
Evidence, 77 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2893, 2932-33, 2933 n.227 (2009) (discussing a
National Academy of Sciences report finding that little or no scientific evidence sup-
ports the validity of fingerprints); Nathan Benedict, Note, Fingerprints and the Daubert
Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed Remedy,
46 ARiz. L. REV. 519, 521-22 (2004).
274 Rules of Professional Responsibility do not bind pro se defendants. See ANNO-
TATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. annot. (6th ed. 2007) ("The Rules of
Professional Conduct govern lawyer discipline."); see also Trujillo v. Bd. of Educ., Nos.
CIV 02-1146JB/LFG, CIV 03-1185JB/LFG, 2007 WL 2461630, at *11 (D.N.M. May 31,
2007). And, while ethical rules prohibit criminal defense attorneys from advancing
frivolous arguments on behalf of their clients, these rules are secondary to a defen-
dant's right to force the prosecution to prove each element of its case and are rarely
enforced. See Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues
in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2003) (discussing application of
Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Section 110 of the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers). Indeed, a comment in Section 110 of the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers characterizes the rule as providing a "more
permissive requirement for advocacy in criminal-defense representations," RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. a (2000), which perhaps
explains why criminal defense lawyers are "rarely disciplined or otherwise sanctioned
for asserting frivolous positions in advocacy, aside from instances of contempt," id.
§ 110 Reporter's Note cmt. f. See also In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1989)
("[C]ourts generally tolerate arguments on behalf of criminal defendants that would
likely be met with sanctions if advanced in a civil proceeding."). Some states may, by
statute, require a defendant who pursues a frivolous defense to bear the costs of the
state's prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Stanosheck, 180 N.W.2d 226, 228-29 (Neb.
1970).
It is important to note, however, that a court may exclude evidence offered by a
pro se defendant relating to an irrelevant or unsupportable defense. See, e.g., State v.
Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Vt. 1979); State v. Aver, 745 P.2d 479, 483 (Wash.
1987). In addition, even if a court allows the evidence, it may refuse to submit corre-
sponding instructions on the defense to the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Kabat, 797
[VOL. 86:2
REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE
instances of contempt.2 7 5 In our criminal justice system, a verdict of
"guilty" is penalty enough.
A court should find a defendant incompetent if the beliefs con-
stituent to his reasoning regarding the selection of a defense are inca-
pable of evidentiary support in the world as we understand it.
Reasons incapable of evidentiary support would include beliefs "either
impossible absolutely, or, at least, impossible under the circumstances
of the individual." 276 An example of an impossible belief would
include a defendant's assertion, in justification of his decision to pur-
sue a self-defense theory, that the victim had threatened the defen-
dant by engaging in a slow-motion dance with knives while suspended
in midair.277 This assertion would contradict the laws of nature as we
understand them and so would not constitute adequate reasoning.
An example of a belief impossible as to the individual would include a
person's claim that he killed millions of people while being locked in
a mental hospital.278 This assertion would be "impossible under the
circumstances of the individual,"279 so the professor of this belief
would be, as to this matter, incompetent.
One potentially troubling aspect of the proposed standard is its
treatment of religious beliefs. Many in our society share common
F.2d 580, 590-92 (8th Cir. 1986); Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 462
(Mass. App. Ct. 1982).
275 If a pro se defendant refuses to heed warnings by a judge to stop arguing
unsupportable views of the law or introducing inadmissible evidence, he may be held
in contempt. See United States v. Cohen, 510 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2007). In
addition, if a defendant lies on the stand, he may be prosecuted for perjury. See 18
U.S.C. § 1621 (2006) (criminalizing perjury).
276 Guiteau's Case, 10 F. 161, 170 (D.D.C. 1882) ("[T]he insane delusion, accord-
ing to all testimony, seems to be an unreasoning and incorrigible belief in the exis-
tence of facts which are either impossible absolutely, or, at least, impossible under the
circumstances of the individual." (emphasis omitted)); see McKinnon v. State, 181 S.E.
91, 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935) (concluding that a belief was not a delusion, where,
although "no doubt incorrect .... there were facts to sustain it"); Scott v. Scott, 72
N.E. 708, 710 (Ill. 1904) ("An insane delusion is a belief in something impossible in
the nature of things, or impossible under the circumstances surrounding the afflicted
individual, and which refuses to yield either to evidence or reason."); State v. Lewis,
22 P. 241, 250 (Nev. 1889) ("An insane delusion is an unreasonable and incorrigible
belief in the existence of facts, which are either impossible absolutely, or impossible
under the circumstances of the individual.").
277 Cf People v. Morton, 570 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (App. Div. 1991) (involving a
defendant, found competent to stand trial, who claimed that his frail, sixty-six-year-old
mother had "learned a 'devine [sic] oriental assassin dance', which involved spinning
around in a violent yet graceful manner while striking him with her knuckles, elbows
and knees").
278 This example was drawn from Saks, supra note 163, at 964.
279 Guiteau's Case, 10 F. at 170.
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religious beliefs that defy evidentiary support, such as the belief in
God or the belief that Jesus Christ rose from the dead. Some courts
have allowed the presentation of defenses motivated by religious
beliefs, especially when those beliefs are held by a majority or vocal
minority of people in the United States. For instance, a court in
Nebraska allowed defendants charged with criminal trespass on abor-
tion clinic property to argue that their actions were necessary in order
to protect the lives of unborn children. 280 Other manifestations of
religious beliefs may be perceived as clearly delusional, such as a
mother's belief that she was God and that Satan had hidden himself in
the body of her child, thus justifying her beating, tearing the flesh
from, and ultimately killing her infant son.28 1 It is impossible to craft
a standard of sound reasoning based on evidentiary support that dis-
tinguishes between delusional and rational (or, at least, socially toler-
ated) religious beliefs. 282
The proposed standard would treat all religious beliefs, assuming
they are incapable of evidentiary support, as inadequate for establish-
ing one's ability to reason. As I argue in Part IV, however, courts
should only find incompetent those defendants whose functional defi-
cits stem from mental illness or mental disability. Under that stan-
dard, a court could not find incompetent a person who supports a key
decision of his defense with a religious belief when that person does
not have a mental illness or disability. The causation element, in
effect, privileges the religious views of non-mentally ill defendants. 283
It could be argued, then, that this standard discriminates against men-
tally ill people who hold nonconventional religious beliefs. That is,
280 See William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases: Bring in the
Juy, 38 NEW ENG. L. RV. 3, 34 n.119 (2003).
281 See Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1059 (Md. 1979).
282 See Saks, supra note 163, at 963 n.51. Other standards not based on evidentiary
support-such as one crediting only beliefs associated with a mainstream religion,
with a religion practiced by a substantial body of persons, or with a religious system
supported by a text in broad distribution-would discriminate against lesser known
religions, and the application of such a standard may bear no rational relationship to
individual believers' competence to make sound decisions. Cf Luban, supra note 64,
at 478-79 (proposing that "acceptable reason[s]" to establish competence include
beliefs accepted by a "recognized group"). A nebulous standard prohibiting "irra-
tional" or "clearly delusional" beliefs, ostensibly could separate delusional from
rational religious beliefs, but its application would turn on the subjective values and
perspective of the trial court.
283 A central premise of this Article is that courts should generally permit a defen-
dant capable of meaningful autonomy to respond to the prosecution's charges on his
own terms. If the defendant chooses (as opposed to being compelled by mental ill-
ness) to explain his actions or make decisions on the basis of his religious beliefs, then
he generally should be permitted to do so.
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unfortunately, a valid criticism. But, while not a perfect proxy, it is
likely that decisions motivated by religious reasons that are, them-
selves, the product of mental illness do not reflect the best interests of
the individual believer. If this observation is generally true, then the
standard is a rational-though imperfect-measure of competence.
Under the proposed standard, a decision to select a particular
defense that is justified by a defendant's opinions, values, or under-
standing of others' intentions would be worthy of deference. 284 While
intangible perspectives on or responses to the world are not easy to
verify or refute with evidentiary support,285 most would not be impos-
sible. A primary aim of self-representation is to allow a defendant to
sculpt his defense in accordance with his values and priorities. 28 6
Therefore, courts should presume that such reasons are rational. 287
Examples would include reasons justifying a decision such as "the vic-
tim intended to kill me," "I feared the victim would take my money,"
or "I care more about defending my reputation than going to prison."
Professor Saks has made the case for a similar, but more rigorous,
standard in the context of medical treatment decisionmaking.288 Saks
has argued that a competence standard should perform three func-
tions: identify the abilities necessary to make decisions deserving of
deference, protect an individual's expression of his values and beliefs,
and designate as incompetent a reasonably small class of people. 289
Her analysis of case law involving civil competence determinations,
especially those concerning testamentary competence, reveals that
courts predominantly characterize as "delusional"-and thus find
284 See Saks, supra note 163, at 984-92 (arguing that beliefs incapable of eviden-
tiary support-such as values, intentions, and feelings-should not be considered
delusional unless they include beliefs that are patently false).
285 See id. at 974.
286 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 815-17 (1975); see also Martin Sabelli &
Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An Argument for Fairness and Against
Self Representation in the Criminal Justice System, 91 J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161,
189-90 (2000) ("Underlying the autonomy viewpoint is the notion that attorneys will
not make better decisions than clients because they often do not fully understand a
client's interests and needs, especially when there are major social, economic, or cul-
tural differences between the two. The autonomy viewpoint suggests that allowing a
client control of decisions will produce decisions that better meet client needs and
affirm a client's sense of personhood and individuality." (footnote omitted)).
287 See generally Jennifer Moye et al., A Conceptual Model and Assessment Template for
Capacity Evaluation in Adult Guardianship, 47 GERONTOLOGIST 591, 595 (2007)
("Choices that are linked with lifetime values are rational for an individual even if
outside the norm. A person's race, ethnicity, culture, and religion may impact indi-
vidual values and preferences.").
288 See Saks, supra note 163, at 962-65.
289 See id. at 949-50.
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incompetent-those beliefs that are actually supported by no evi-
dence. 290 Saks argues that courts should adopt this standard in the
context of competence to consent to medical treatment.2 91 Saks
acknowledges that utilization of the concept of "delusion" is subop-
timal in that it "fail[s] . . . to single out falsehoods so patent that no
capable person would believe them."29 2 In particular, it is possible
that evidence supporting a belief may exist but be inaccessible. 293
Notwithstanding the possible infringement on idiosyncratic expres-
sion, Saks considers this standard the best available for medical treat-
ment decisionmaking. 294
Saks's standard may be appropriate in the context of medical
treatment decisionmaking, but it is too stringent for self-representa-
tion. In particular, society should expect patients deciding upon a
course of medical treatment to be capable of articulating a true or
accurate reason justifying their decisions. 295 In the context of crimi-
nal defense, however, a defendant does not owe a duty to profess
"truth." Rather, we allow and even encourage defendants to craft a
defense based on perceived deficiencies in the government's case,
regardless of the ultimate "truth" of the defense. 296 The reason pro-
fessed by a defendant to justify the selection of his defense (and the
defense itself) may well be strategic, rather than representative of
290 See id. at 956.
291 See id. at 962-65.
292 Id. at 963.
293 See id.
294 See id.
295 See id. (defending her standard as "rul[ing] out beliefs that plainly fail to do
what they purport to do, that is, portray the world accurately").
296 Defense strategies reflect a defendant's evaluation of the state's case and are
not sculpted, necessarily, to reveal the "truth." See Edward Roslak, Comment, Game
Over: A Proposal to Reform Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 695, 708
(2009) (describing how, "when presented with a choice of strategies, both [defend-
ants and prosecutors] have a strong incentive to ensure not that the best kinds of
information enter the trial arena, but rather that whatever information or lack
thereof promotes the achievement of the party's desired partisan outcome" and
observing that "a 'truthful' outcome is not necessarily as relevant to the parties as
achieving their own goals"). Professional rules governing defense attorneys recognize
the utility of this practice. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 110 (2000) (providing that, while "[a] lawyer may not . .. assert or controvert an
issue [in a proceeding], unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous," "a
lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding... may so defend the proceeding
as to require that the prosecutor establish every necessary element"); id. § 110 cmt. f
("[A] lawyer defending a person accused of crime, even if convinced that the guilt of
the offense charged can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, may require the prose-
cution to prove every element of the offense, including those facts as to which the lawyer
knows the accused can present no effective defense." (emphasis added)).
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what the defendant believes to be true. Therefore, to be competent
to control his defense, a defendant should be able to articulate a rea-
son for a decision that is capable of evidentiary support, not necessarily
supported by actual evidence.
Professor Richard Bonnie has proposed a competence standard
for use in criminal adjudication that is similar to the one proposed by
Professor Saks.297 The thrust of Bonnie's standard, coined the "basic
rationality" test, is that a defendant should "be able to express a rea-
son for [a] decision that has a plausible grounding in reality."298 He
defines "plausible" as "not grossly irrational."299 This standard is
intended to foreclose decisions affected by "gross delusions."300 Bon-
nie does not clarify whether reasons plausibly grounded in reality
must actually be supported by some evidence or may merely be capable
of evidentiary support. His citation to Saks's work,30 1 however, indi-
cates his intent to adopt her standard of "delusion."3 0 2 This reference
suggests that plausible reasons are supported by some modicum of
evidence. Bonnie also equates the "ability to give a plausible reason"
with at least a "minimal ability to appreciate one's situation,"303 signal-
ing that a "plausible" reason would have an actual basis in reality. For
reasons articulated in response to Saks's position above, I suggest that
requiring a defendant to profess a "true" (or evidentially substanti-
297 See Bonnie, supra note 33, at 574. The "basic rationality" test is one of five
standards for decisional competence that Bonnie suggests for criminal adjudication.
See id. at 572-76. To decide which test should apply to various decisions made by
criminal defendants, Bonnie evaluates the degree to which the decision implicates the
norms of dignity, reliability, and autonomy. Id. Bonnie argues that the "basic ration-
ality" test should apply to a defendant's decisions to plead guilty in accordance with
counsel's advice, id. at 578, and to waive the right to a jury trial against counsel's
advice, id. at 582, 584. To waive the right to counsel, Bonnie suggests that defendants
should meet a more demanding decisional competence test called "reasoned choice."
See id. at 579, 586. This test would require the ability to engage in a logical, deliberate
reasoning process involving a comparison of the consequences of potential alternative
solutions. See id. at 575-76. The test also includes the element of "substantial appre-
ciation," defined as the ability to make decisions free from the influence of "cognitive
and emotional factors which [could] impair a person's ability to relate what she
'understands' about the reasons for choosing one or another course of action to her
own situation." Id. at 574. Others have advanced compelling reasons why this stan-
dard is insufficiently deferential to a defendant's autonomy. See Slobogin & Mash-
burn, supra note 33, at 1603.
298 Bonnie, supra note 33, at 574.
299 Id. at 576 fig.1.
300 Id. at 574.
301 See id. at 574 n.121 (citing Saks, supra note 163).
302 See Saks, supra note 163, at 956.
303 See Bonnie, supra note 33, at 575 n.124.
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ated) reason for a decision fails to take into account the vulgar reali-
ties of our criminal defense system. Similar to the standard proposed
in this Article, however, Bonnie would find a defendant decisionally
competent if only one of several reasons expressed for a decision were
plausible. 30 4 In other words, Bonnie agrees that a defendant should
only be found incompetent when all of his reasons for a decision are
patently false. 305
Professor Christopher Slobogin has advocated for a similar, and
perhaps even more stringent, test of reasoning as the appropriate
standard for representational competence. 30 6 Slobogin explicitly
adopts Bonnie's "basic rationality" test 307 but interprets it to require
overriding any decision that rests, in part, on a delusional belief.30 8 In
other words, if a defendant appears to make a decision in part for
"clearly false" beliefs and in part for rational reasons, the defendant
should be found incompetent to make the decision. The implications
of Slobogin's proposed standard may be gleaned from his application
of the standard to the case of Colin Ferguson, the Long Island Rail
Road Killer.309 Ferguson apparently decided to represent himself in
order to avoid an insanity defense.3 10 While evidence of his reasoning
is scarce, a statement by one evaluating psychologist suggests that Fer-
guson's decision was at least partially motivated by wanting to avoid
spending the rest of his life in a mental hospital or being "viewed as a
crazy person."13 1' These reasons are certainly rational, as Slobogin rec-
304 In applying his "basic rationality" standard to the context of a guilty plea, Bon-
nie states:
[T] he plea would not be valid, even if the defendant adequately understands
the nature and consequences of a guilty plea, if none of the defendant's
reasons for pleading guilty has any plausible grounding in reality (i.e., if all
the defendant's reasons for pleading guilty rest on patently false beliefs
about the world.)
Id. at 578.
305 See id.
306 See Slobogin, supra note 53, at 401-05.
307 Id. at 402.
308 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 183, at 202 (arguing that a defendant's decision
should be overridden in the presence of evidence of "clearly false beliefs" and that, "if
part of the reason" a defendant rejects the insanity defense is delusional, "then he
fails even the basic rationality test"); id. at 204; see also Slobogin, supra note 53, at 403
("[The basic rationality and self-regard test] requires an understanding of the risks
and benefits of the decision, the absence of clearly erroneous beliefs about those risks
and benefits, and the willingness to act on what is known.").
309 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 183, at 203-04.
310 See id. at 203.
311 See id. at 204.
[VOL. 86:2
REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE
ognizes. 312 Ferguson also appeared to believe, however, "that he did
not commit the crimes, despite overwhelming evidence to the con-
trary." 313 If one reason for Ferguson's rejection of an insanity defense
was a belief that he did not shoot the victims, and if he fired his attor-
neys for refusing to pursue a defense of innocence, then, Slobogin
argues, Ferguson should have been found incompetent to waive his
right to assistance by counsel, given the overwhelming evidence of his
guilt.3 14
Slobogin's approach is troubling for two reasons. First, his test
appears to be insufficiently deferential to autonomy. Professor Saks
has discussed the impact of "the pervasive influence of the irrational
and the unconscious" in "the mental lives of us all." 31 5 If irrationality
permeates the everyday decisions of "competent" people, then we
should be wary of overriding decisions driven, only in part, by reasons
unsupported by apparent evidence. Indeed, many consider the deci-
sion to waive counsel to be inherently delusional. The adage that
"one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client" 316 reflects the com-
monly held belief that, despite a pro se defendant's apparent belief to
the contrary, a self-represented defendant will harm, not help, his case
by discharging counsel and representing himself.3 17 Moreover, bra-
vado and bluff are common in the criminal defense arena. It is not
uncommon for a defendant to attest vociferously to his innocence one
day and to admit guilt when a favorable plea bargain is offered the
next, thus suggesting that his professed innocence was a farce or, in
Saks's parlance, "delusional." To account for common puffery and
the pervasive influence of the irrational, courts should allow a defen-
dant the benefit of the doubt and permit him to exercise his constitu-
tional right to control his defense so long as he can articulate a
plausible reason supporting his selection of a defense.
Second, Slobogin finds dispositive the "delusion" that Ferguson
maintained his innocence in the face of strong evidence of guilt.
While it is possible that a defendant's account of events underlying a
charge could qualify as "delusional"-whether defined as unsup-
ported by any evidence or incapable of evidentiary support-courts
312 See id.
313 Id.
314 See id.
315 Saks, supra note 163, at 950; see also Morse, supra note 187, at 549 n.38 (refer-
encing theoretical views positing that "all human beings are suffering from some form
of mental disorder to some extent at all times").
316 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
317 A recently conducted empirical study questions the veracity of this adage. See
Hashimoto, supra note 111, at 447-54.
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should hesitate to deny a defendant the right to proceed pro se
merely because he refuses to admit to the state's version of the facts.
The state's allegations are just that-unproven assertions-until they
are accepted by a judge or jury beyond a reasonable doubt. It seems
unjust to assume in advance of trial that the prosecution's allegations
are true and a defendant's denial of them and alternative explanation
are "delusional." Also, it is uncontroverted that the majority of
defendants who plead "not guilty" are ultimately convicted.318 In light
of this fact, judges and defense attorneys often assume that most
defendants are guilty of the crimes charged.319 Many defendants how-
ever, never admit to their crimes, even to their attorneys. 320 And soci-
ety does not demand that they do so. A defendant does not owe a
duty to confess his crime to his attorney, to the jury, or to the court,
which is why we do not require defendants to testify and explain their
actions. Indeed, society to some degree sanctions the mounting of
farfetched defenses.321 Consistent with this premise, in establishing a
right to self-representation, the Supreme Court in Faretta rejected and
derided the British practice in the Star Chamber of disallowing a
defendant to advance a defense unless his counsel attested to its
merit.
3 2 2
318 See id. at 452 (concluding that only one percent of criminal defendants repre-
sented by counsel are acquitted at trial, the same rate as that of nonrepresented
defendants); Uphoff, supra note 163, at 807 ("Yet in the end.., the vast majority of
defendants plead guilty or, if they go to trial, are convicted.").
319 See David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man ?, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa-fact
grann (quoting the attorney of Cameron Todd Willingham, who may have been
wrongly executed for murdering his three children, as saying, "Everyone thinks
defense lawyers must believe their clients are innocent, but that's seldom true....
Most of the time, they're guilty as sin.").
320 See F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting
the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYUJ. PUB. L.
189, 212 (2002) ('Defendants who are charged with more serious crimes are much
less likely to confess to their attorneys; some attorneys believe that this reluctance
derives from the defendant's belief that an attorney is more likely to zealously defend
a client whom he believes to be innocent rather than one whom he knows to be
guilty.").
321 Some state ethics decisions indicate that a lawyer could, consistent with his
ethical responsibilities, pursue an otherwise frivolous defense intended to result in
jury nullification. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 320 (2003) (permit-
ting lawyers to argue defenses that may lead to jury nullification because "lawyers
defending a criminal case are authorized to engage in conduct that, in other contexts,
might seem inconsistent with the spirit of the Rules").
322 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821-22, 822 n.18 (1975).
[VOL. 86:2
REPRESENTATIONAL COMPETENCE
As a society, we typically do not find defendants "insane" merely
because they insist upon their innocence. But Slobogin's test could
function to invalidate the decisions of defendants who insist upon
their innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt when it
appears that this belief partially motivates their decisions. Because it
may be difficult to distinguish a guilty defendant who really believes
that he is innocent from one who merely wants to put the government
to its proof (and suggests alternative scenarios as "what-ifs"), courts
should hesitate before denying a defendant the right to control his
defense on this basis. And, where a defendant expresses belief in an
implausible series of events underlying the charged offense but articu-
lates additional, plausible, rational reasons for his selection of a
defense, the court should allow the defendant's decision to stand.
Two implications of the standard proposed in this Article-that a
defendant possesses adequate reasoning ability if he is capable ofjusti-
fying his selection of a defense with a single reason capable of eviden-
tiary support in the world as we understand it-are worth mentioning.
First, if a defendant has fixed false beliefs that are resistant to reason,
but these false beliefs only marginally affect the selection of his
defense or are tangential to it, then a court should allow his defense
to stand.323 Restricting findings of incompetence to select a defense
to situations in which delusions clearly form the underpinnings of the
defense should prevent courts from succumbing to the temptation to
impose counsel on a defendant wanting to pursue a foolish, yet lucid,
defense or one espousing "odd" beliefs.
Second, courts should not assess the wisdom of a defendant's
decisions, so long as the defendant appears capable of ascribing a
problem to a rational source and can identify a plausible reason to
support a decision. 32 4 Professor Nancy Knauer has pointed out the
difficulty in evaluating the quality of an individual's decisionmaking
process without measuring the "quality and social desirability of the
decision ultimately reached."325 She states succinctly, "[C] apacity has
the potential to become the ultimate self-fulfilling doctrine: those who
exercise approved choices have capacity, whereas those who exercise
socially undesirable choices lack capacity."3 26 This cautionary note
has particular salience in the context of self-representation, where,
323 See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 33, at 1603.
324 See Luban, supra note 64, at 477 (discussing the views of Dennis Thompson
and Joel Feinberg on the subject).
325 See NancyJ. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of Auton-
omy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 321, 342-43 (2003).
326 Id. at 343.
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despite empirical evidence to the contrary,327 courts widely assume
that deciding to forgo representation by an attorney is a "bad" deci-
sion,3 28 which is probably the product of mental illness.32 9 Relatedly,
the likelihood that a defendant's chosen defense will succeed, either
as an absolute matter or as compared to an alternative (rejected)
defense, should not factor into the proposed competence standard.
While others would surely disagree, 330 allowing a court to weigh the
merits of a defense in a competence determination creeps too close to
sanctioning the substitution of the court's judgment of a defendant's
best interests for his own.
In sum, in order to honor the preference for autonomy and to
safeguard the reliability and fairness of the proceeding, a defendant
should be capable ofjustifying key decisions, such as the selection of a
particular defense, with a single reason that has a plausible grounding
in reality. Acceptable justifications include reasons enjoying eviden-
tiary support and those capable of evidentiary support in the world as
we understand it. A court should find a defendant incompetent if the
beliefs constituent to his reasoning are incapable of evidentiary sup-
port. Reasons incapable of evidentiary support include beliefs either
impossible as an absolute matter or impossible under the circum-
stances of the individual. This standard would accommodate individ-
uals' differing decisionmaking styles; respect variation in defendants'
beliefs, values, and preferences; and constrain a court's ability to find
327 See Hashimoto, supra note 111, at 447-54.
328 On multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has remarked that "[i]t is undenia-
ble that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's
guidance than by their own unskilled efforts." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400
(1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834
(1975)).
329 See Hashimoto, supra note 111, at 459 ("Because of the long-held assumption
that those who represent themselves are mentally ill, a defendant's decision to
represent himself, even absent other indications of mental illness, may well give rise to
a concern on the part of the court that the defendant is mentally ill."). Hashimoto's
empirical study questioned the validity of the assumption that many, or most, defend-
ants who choose to proceed pro se are mentally ill. Her analysis of the incidence of
court-ordered competence evaluations in cases in which a defendant was unrepre-
sented at the disposition of the case suggested that seventy-eight percent of pro se
defendants did not exhibit signs of mental illness, at least not sufficient to warrant a
competence evaluation. See id. at 456, 458. Of the twenty-two percent of pro se
defendants who were evaluated, only nine percent were ordered to undergo compe-
tence evaluations prior to invoking the right to self-representation. Id. at 459.
330 See Thomas R. Litwack, The Competency of Criminal Defendants to Refuse, for Delu-
sional Reasons, a Viable Insanity Defense Recommended by Counsel 21 BEH-A\,. Sci. & L. 135,
144 (2003).
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"incompetent" those decisions that a court believes to be unwise or
eccentric.
E. Solution Implementation
The final stage of problem solving involves solution implementa-
tion,331 or carrying out the chosen solution. 332 Solution implementa-
tion requires performance skills that may differ from those skills
necessary for effective problem solving.333 For instance, a person may
possess intact decisionmaking powers but lack the ability to imple-
ment a chosen solution due to anxiety, emotional distress, or deficits
in communication, social, or technical skills. 33 4 In addition, a person
may manifest the ability to make decisions in one setting-unhurried
and with the assistance of his social support network, for instance-
but be unable to make decisions in a real-life decisionmaking context.
As a preliminary point, Faretta makes clear that a defendant need
not perform well at trial-indeed all members of the Court indicated
their expectation that an unrepresented defendant would fare
poorly.335 In recognizing a right to self-representation, the Court
acknowledged that a defendant will likely lack the skill and knowledge
necessary to prepare a defense.3 36 In addition, as previously men-
tioned, Faretta stresses that a defendant's possession of technical legal
knowledge is irrelevant to his competence to proceed pro se.3
3 7
Therefore, requiring any degree of technical knowledge or skill-or
mastery of relevant statutes or rules-is clearly prohibited by the
Court's precedent.
331 See D'ZuRmLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 31-34. In addition to solution imple-
mentation, Goldfried, D'Zurilla, and Nezu include solution verification in this final
problem-solving stage. See id. Solution verification refers to the process of evaluating
the degree to which the outcome matches the problem solver's expectations and the
individual's response to the congruence or discrepancy. See id. at 32-34. Because of
the unique nature of trial, solution verification is of limited utility for a competence
analysis. While some trial decisions will have immediate consequences susceptible to
evaluation, a pro se defendant will not be able to assess the effectiveness of many
strategic decisions until the conclusion of trial, if ever.
332 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 31-34; D'Zurilla & Nezu, supra note
154, at 157; Nezu & Nezu, supra note 149, at 189.
333 See D'ZURILLA & NEZU, supra note 136, at 32.
334 See id.
335 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
336 See id. at 833 n.43 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
337 See id. at 835, 836 ("[A] defendant need not himself have the skill and experi-
ence of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-
representation.").
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Requiring pro se defendants to possess strong performance and
implementation skills in order to maintain control over their defenses
also fails to recognize the importance of autonomy to the self-repre-
sentation right. Because the predominant aim of self-representation
is to preserve and effectuate the autonomy of the defendant, it is
largely inappropriate to include solution implementation in a thresh-
old competence inquiry. A person's ability to carry out his decisions
personally is irrelevant to his status as an autonomous deci-
sionmaker. 338 If an individual possesses those abilities necessary to
identify his best interests and make decisions consistent with those
interests, then the Sixth Amendment gives him the right to control his
defense.
To the extent that a defendant is decisionally competent but
lacks necessary performance skills, courts should appoint standby
counsel to effectuate the decisions of the defendant. 39 At least one
court has taken this tack, appointing standby counsel to carry out the
strategic and tactical decisions of a defendant with severe communica-
tion problems.3 40 The appointment of standby counsel to perform
338 See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 250 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Any
limitations due to physical or educational impairments that do not affect the ability of
the accused to choose self-representation over counsel can probably be overcome, if
necessary, through the use of stand-by counsel or interpreters."). Similar sentiments
have been expressed in the context of guardianship proceedings. SeeJennifer Moye,
Guardianship and Conservatorship, in EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 59, at 309,
311-12 ("[T]he inability to write checks related to severe arthritis in an older adult
does not imply the individual is incapable of managing funds, in the same way that a
spinal cord injury in a younger adult does not assume any incompetence, but rather
that assistance may be needed in completing a task. The need for psychosocial or
nursing services to accomplish a task at the elder's direction should not be confused
with impairment in judgment and decision making that may underlie the need for a
substitute decision maker."); Anderer, supra note 23, at 35-36, ("The final decision
regarding how his or her needs will be met should be made by the individual if his or
her decisionmaking processes are intact .... Before a substitute decisionmaker is
appointed, a determination must be made that the person cannot make the decisions
that the substitute decisionmaker will make.").
339 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 815 ("To deny an accused a choice of procedure in
circumstances in which he, though a layman, is as capable as any lawyer of making an
intelligent choice, is to impair the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating
them as empty verbalisms." (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269, 280 (1942))).
340 See Savage v. Estelle, 924 F.2d 1459, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant who was physically incapable of conducting
jury voir dire and examination of witnesses, and had not asked for assistance, were not
violated when the trial court appointed an attorney who could communicate on his
behalf); id. at 1464 n.11 (explaining that the defendant was permitted to ask any
questions of witnesses that he wanted but had to do so through standby counsel).
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this execution function is one way to ensure that a defendant's consti-
tutional right to control his defense is impeded only to the extent
necessary to protect the interests of the state. 341 Indeed, an argument
exists that due process requires the appointment of standby counsel to
communicate or execute a defendant's decisions when the defendant
is unable to do so but retains adequate problem-solving and decisional
abilities.3 42 Courts are in agreement, for example, that a criminal
defendant who does not speak English has a due process right to a
translator in order to effectuate his rights to testify and cross-examine
hostile witnesses and to ensure the provision of a fair trial.343 For simi-
lar reasons, a deaf or blind defendant has a due process right to an
interpreter to permit him to participate in his defense. 344 By exten-
sion, a pro se defendant with a communication-related deficiency
should have a due process right to standby counsel or some other
agent to effectuate his decisions in order to honor his constitutional
right to self-representation.
To authorize a substitute decisionmaker to override a defendant's
decisions when the defendant is not adequately (in the opinion of the
court) capable of executing those decisions could, in effect, limit the
self-representation right to a select, privileged few. Such a rule would
permit trial courts to deny self-representation to defendants who are
341 This concept is related to the requirement in constitutional law that an official
act that infringes on an individual's substantial liberty interest must be the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. See generally Stephen A.
Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 355 (2006) (evaluating the application of the compelling government interest
and strict scrutiny requirements in First Amendment litigation); Alan 0. Sykes, The
Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 403 (2003) (analyzing the concept of least
restrictive regulatory measures in the context of the World Trade Organization and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Some courts have held that due pro-
cess requires courts to appoint guardians to make decisions only in those limited
areas in which the ward suffers from incapacity. SeeJohn Parry, Incompetency, Guardi-
anship, and Restoration, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 369, 384-85 (Samuel
Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985); Anderer, supra note 23, at 25.
342 See STEPHEN J. ANDERER, AM. BAR ASS'N DfV. FOR PUB. SERVS., MONOGRAPH No.
1, DETERMINING COMPETENCY IN GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS 14-15 (Nancy A. Cole-
man et al. eds., 1990).
343 See, e.g., United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing
the right to testify); United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (collecting cases); United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973);
United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970) (discussing
due process). Individuals also have a due process right to a translator in deportation
proceedings. See Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2000).
344 See People v. Doe, 602- N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (Crim. Ct. 1993); see also Terry v.
State, 105 So. 386, 387 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925) (discussing the state constitution).
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illiterate or have a speech impediment, a meager educational back-
ground, or a limited proficiency with the English language. A court
could even deny self-representation, contrary to Faretta, to a person
deemed unable to master the intricacies of trial procedure.
These are not mere theoretical possibilities. In 1980, Wisconsin
adopted a competence standard to measure a defendant's ability to
conduct "meaningful" self-representation. 345 Relevant considerations
include a defendant's educational background, literacy, fluency in
English, and actual handling of the case, as well as "any physical or
psychological disability which may significantly affect his ability to
communicate a possible defense to the jury. ' 346 Under this standard,
a trial court terminated a pro se defendant's representation on
grounds of competence, when the defendant, during the cross-exami-
nation of a particular witness, asked questions that were repetitive and
lacked foundation, testified in the course of asking several questions,
and interrupted the court. 347 Another trial court held incompetent a
twenty-five-year-old high school graduate with no history of treatment
for mental illness,348 who, according to a federal habeas court, "was
able to understand criminal proceedings, understood legal terminol-
ogy and trial procedures, was not delusional[,] and was of normal
intelligence." 349 The trial court's basis for finding the defendant
incompetent was his lack of "a rudimentary understanding of how to
secure expert testimony and what type of information to present."350
345 See Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Wis. 1980), overruled in part on other
grounds by State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716 (Wis. 1997).
346 See State v. Marquardt, 705 N.W.2d 878, 891-93 (Wis. 2005); Klessig, 564
N.W.2d at 724; Pickens, 292 N.W.2d at 611; In re Termination of Parental Rights to
Sophia S., 715 N.W.2d 692, 699 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
347 See In re Commitment of Stokes, No. 2004 AP 1555, 2007 WL 521243, at *2,
*12, *14 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2007). After exhaustively reviewing the trial tran-
script, however, a reviewing court found that the defendant did not engage in
obstreperous or disruptive conduct and that he "was able to conduct an acceptable, if
not at times eloquent, questioning of the witnesses." Id. at *15. The court reversed
and remanded the case for a new trial. Id.
348 Gomez v. Berge, No. 04-C-17-C, 2004 WL 1852978, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18,
2004).
349 Id. at *3.
350 Id. at *4. On direct appeal, the circuit court found that, although Gomez had
seemed competent to stand trial and to have executed a valid waiver of counsel, his
actual handling of the case at trial demonstrated that he did not understand the dis-
advantages of self-representation and lacked the competence to conduct his own
defense. See id. at *6. In particular, the trial court was frustrated by the defendant's
rambling open statement (and its opening the door to the admission of tapes previ-
ously suppressed), his desire to call witnesses who possessed either irrelevant or cumu-
lative testimony, and the defendant's failure to secure an expert witness. See id. at *3.
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Similar results followed in California, when the state courts
adopted a "coherent communication" standard. 351 This standard per-
mitted one trial court to deny self-representation to a defendant with
a speech impediment.3 52 Another denied a defendant's request to
proceed pro se because he had a seventh-grade education, read at a
ninth-grade level, and had "rather low verbal skills."1353 Both of these
decisions were upheld on appeal. 354 These cases 355 demonstrate the
salience of Justice Scalia's concern, voiced in his dissent, that Edwards
would result in judges' denying pro se requests to avoid the messiness
and inconvenience of administering trials with unrepresented
defendants.3 56
While representational competence should not include a robust
communication or performance element, several elements of solution
implementation may be appropriate for inclusion in a representa-
tional competence standard. 357 In particular, a defendant should be
able to make decisions within the context of trial. This requires the
ability to sustain mental organization,3 5 8 maintain concentration or
attention, make decisions within a short timeframe, and withstand the
stress likely to accompany trial participation. 359 Trial is stressful and
necessitates the ability to make decisions within a short period of time
351 See People v. Manago, 269 Cal. Rptr. 819, 820-21 (Ct. App. 1990); People v.
Burnett, 234 Cal. Rptr. 67, 74-77 (Ct. App. 1987). Burnett held that one aspect of a
defendant's competence to proceed pro se is an ability to "coherently communicate"
his defense to the trier of fact. Id. at 76.
352 See People v. Watkins, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Ct. App. 1992).
353 See Manago, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
354 See Watkins, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8; Manago, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
355 This line of cases was overruled in People v. Welch, 976 P.2d 754, 775 (Cal.
1999). See People v. Santacruz, No. E039277, 2007 WL 1365744, *9 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 10, 2007). California courts have not revived this line of cases since Edwards.
356 See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 188-89 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Courts have recognized that "a measure of unorthodoxy, confusion and delay is likely,
perhaps inevitable in pro se cases." United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
357 See Maroney, supra note 160, at 1392, 1397-98 & n.130 (arguing that decisional
competence should include the ability to "formulate and execute a course of action,"
but not detailing the functional components of the execution or performance
element).
358 I am grateful to Richard Bonnie for stressing the importance of this element of
representational competence.
359 The Edwards Court alluded to some of these elements. The Court listed some
conditions that "impair the defendant's ability to play the significantly expanded role
required for self-representation," including anxiety and deficits in sustaining atten-
tion and concentration. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (quoting APA Brief, supra note 55,
at 26).
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before an impatient, potentially hostile audience.3 60 Often within the
span of a few minutes, a defendant will need to decide, for example,
whether to object to arguably prejudicial or irrelevant questions in the
direct examination of a witness, whether to cross-examine the witness,
and what lines of inquiry to pursue. A representational competence
standard should not require the ability to make numerous decisions
under stress consistently. Sound reasons of trial strategy, for instance,
may support advancing multiple (and perhaps contradictory)
defenses, abstaining from objecting to all possibly irrelevant question-
ing, and not pursing every line of questioning consistent with one's
defense. But a defendant arguably should have the capacity for mak-
ing a decision without protracted delay, remembering that decision,
and acting in general accordance with that decision as the trial
proceeds.
Alternatively, sound reasons of policy support imposing a differ-
ent competence standard for pretrial and trial decisions. Certain
forms of mental illness may lead individuals to decompensate under
stress, causing their thinking to become tangential, circumstantial,
and inefficient.3 61 Such individuals may be perfectly capable, how-
ever, of making rational decisions outside a frenzied, public, trial envi-
ronment. In addition, certain decisions of high personal value may be
made prior to trial, such as what defense to exert and which witnesses
to call.3 62 Given these realities, courts should consider allowing a
360 See State v. Latimer, No. 99-1945-CR, 2000 WL 124502, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb.
3, 2000) (upholding a denial of a motion to proceed pro se partially on the grounds
that the defendant "would likely be unable to make decisions about his case within
the proper time frames, and this inability would paralyze him at trial").
361 See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No.
06-6407) (detailing a forensic psychiatrist's testimony that Panetti, a schizophrenic,
"decompensates when under stress, causing his thinking to become tangential, cir-
cumstantial, and inefficient"); see also State v. Doss, 568 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Ariz. 1977)
("There was evidence that the defendant was physically unable to carry on his
defense, and at various times the defendant has acknowledged that stress affects his
speech and presents a danger of a seizure."); People v. Berling, 251 P.2d 1017, 1022
(Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (attributing defendant's dizziness, fainting, and inability to con-
centrate to "an emotional and nervous upset from strain" of trial).
362 Richard Bonnie has identified certain strategic and tactical decisions that may
be of particular import to criminal defendants. See Bonnie, supra note 33, at 569 &
n.110. In particular, the selection of particular defenses, such as insanity, is likely to
implicate the personal values of the defendant. Recognizing this reality, many, but
not all, courts have recognized a defendant's right to decide whether or not to raise
an insanity defense. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 183, at 211-12. Given the high per-
sonal value of this and other decisions, it may be appropriate to require a lower
threshold of representational competence for decisions of particular personal import
that are capable of being made prior to trial.
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defendant with minimally intact decisionmaking abilities to make
binding decisions prior to trial. If the defendant lacks an ability to
make decisions within the bustle of trial, then counsel should be
appointed to represent the defendant at trial. In this instance, all trial
decisions should be made consistently with the defendant's pretrial
decisions unless the defendant directs otherwise. This dual approach
is normatively superior, for it would usurp the decisionmaking power
of the defendant only to the extent that he is decisionally
incompetent.
In addition, a defendant should be able to communicate his deci-
sions to a functionary of the court. To satisfy the Dusky standard to
stand trial, a defendant must be able to communicate pertinent infor-
mation to counsel and express a preference as to fundamental deci-
sions within his decisional domain. 363  Self-representation may,
depending on the support provided to a defendant, require commu-
nicative abilities of a different degree. Counsel, as an agent of the
defendant, is ethically bound to listen to the defendant, ask clarifying
questions, and assist the defendant in reaching a conclusion.- 64
Counsel should be patient, sympathetic, and respectful. At trial, a pro
se defendant may need to communicate decisions to a court actor
with weaker allegiance to the defendant, like the court, the jury, or, if
one is appointed, standby counsel.3 65 As discussed previously, under
due process principles, a court should appoint standby counsel to
communicate a defendant's decisions to the judge or jury if the defen-
dant is capable of communicating with counsel but not with others at
trial.
363 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam); see also
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). Interpreting the Dusky standard, Bonnie
defined competence to assist counsel to include "a capacity to recognize and relate
relevant information to the attorney." Bonnie, supra note 33, at 562-63.
364 See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2002) ("A lawyer shall
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 20 (2000) ("A lawyer must notify a client of decisions to be
made by the client under §§ 21-23 [including whether and on what terms to settle a
claim, how a criminal defendant should plead, whether a criminal defendant should
waive jury trial, whether a criminal defendant should testify, and whether to appeal in
a civil proceeding or criminal prosecution] and must explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.").
365 Christopher Slobogin has argued that "rarely" will a defendant be able to com-
municate with his attorney and respond adequately to ajudge's questions concerning
his understanding of an attorney's role (necessary to effect a valid waiver of counsel),
but be unable to communicate adequately to a jury. See Slobogin, supra note 53, at
405. He does not provide empirical data to support this claim.
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In sum, the principles of Faretta and the predominant goal of
allowing autonomous defendants to control their defenses militate
against requiring every pro se defendant to possess masterful commu-
nication or performance skills. However, courts should consider
including three aspects of solution implementation in a representa-
tional competence standard. These capabilities include being able to
sustain mental organization, withstand the stress of trial, and commu-
nicate decisions to a functionary of the court. These abilities-critical
to a defendant's capacity for making decisions in the real-life setting
of a criminal trial and executing them to a minimal degree-may be
crucial to the actual and apparent fairness of a proceeding and the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. A summary of the represen-
tational competence standard proposed in this Article appears in
Table 1.
TABLE 1. COMPONENTS OF REPRESENTATIONAL
COMPETENCE STANDARD
AbilityAssociated Social Problem-SolvingAbilityDomain
Capacity for perceiving problematic Problem orientation
situations
Ability to identify a plausible source for Problem orientation
the prosecution
Willingness to attend to the Problem orientation
prosecution
Ability to gather information to Problem definition
evaluate the state's case
Ability to generate alternative courses Generation of alternative solutions
of action
Ability to justify key decisions with a Decisionmaking
plausible reason
Ability to maintain mental organization Solution implementation
Ability to withstand the stress of trial Solution implementation
Ability to communicate decisions to a Solution implementation
functionary of the court
IV. IMPORTANCE OF CAUSATION
To accord due respect for a defendant's autonomy, a court
should find a defendant incompetent only if his inability to satisfy a
functional component of a representational competence standard
results from a mental illness or mental disability. While some lower
courts have confined the holding in Edwards to mentally ill defend-
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ants who want to represent themselves,3 66 it is unclear the extent to
which Edwards requires a finding of mental illness or disability to sup-
port a determination of representational incompetence. The express
holding of the Court-"the Constitution permits States to insist upon
representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial
under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point
where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by them-
selves"367-appears to require causation as an essential element of
representational competence. Other language in the decision, how-
ever, is less clear. For instance, the Court does not reject Indiana's
proposed standard of "coherent communication" as constitutionally
impermissible for failing to include a mental illness or disability ele-
ment.36s Instead, the Court refrains from endorsing the proposal as a
federal constitutional standard because the Court is "sufficiently
uncertain . . . as to how that particular standard would work in
practice."36 9
366 The Seventh Circuit, for instance, described "severe mental illness" as "a condi-
tion precedent" for denying the right of self-representation on the grounds of compe-
tence. See United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 385, 391 (7th Cir. 2009). In the court's
words:
Certainly, the right to self-representation cannot be denied merely because a
defendant lacks legal knowledge or otherwise makes for a poor advocate.
And the Edwards Court repeatedly cabined its holding with phrases like
.mental derangement," "gray-area defendant," "borderline-competent crimi-
nal defendant," and, of course, "severe mental illness." Edwards himself,
after all, suffered from schizophrenia and delusions, not just a personality
disorder. So even if we were to read Edwards to require counsel in certain
cases-a dubious reading-the rule would only apply when the defendant is
suffering from a "severe mental illness." Nothing in the opinion suggests
that a court can deny a request for self-representation in the absence of this.
Id. at 391 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171,
173, 175-76 (2008)); see also State v. Connor, 973 A.2d 627, 655 (Conn. 2009) ("We
therefore conclude that, when a trial court is presented with a mentally ill or mentally
incapacitated defendant who, having been found competent to stand trial, elects to
represent himself, the trial court also must ascertain whether the defendant is, in fact,
competent to conduct the trial proceedings without the assistance of counsel.").
367 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178.
368 See id. In its brief, Indiana suggested that a defendant need not be mentally ill
to lack necessary communicative abilities for self-representation. See Brief for Peti-
tioner at 26, Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (No. 07-208) ("At the same time, [a finding of
incompetence] does not depend on any formal medical or psychological diagnosis of
the defendant. What counts are observations of the defendant, not, strictly speaking,
the defendant's mental or physical diagnosis (though that diagnosis may well inform
a court's determination).").
369 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178.
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Causation is one of the defining hallmarks of legal competence
standards in civil and criminal contexts.370 In the words of Professor
Thomas Grisso, "Legal competence constructs require causal inferences
to explain an individual's functional abilities or deficits related to a legal com-
petence. That is, when a person's deficient abilities related to the legal
competence are known, the legal competence construct requires
ascription of the likely reasons for those deficiencies."3 7 1 Most compe-
tence standards require that legally recognized deficiencies originate
from a mental illness or mental disability.3 72 Indeed, some have
argued that depriving an individual of a constitutional right in the
absence of mental impairment would be unconstitutional.373
Limiting the legal recognition of a functional disability to those
deficits caused by a mental illness or disability would help ensure that
courts do not deprive individuals of their constitutional right to
represent themselves merely because their choices are odd or differ-
ent. A fundamental tenet of mental health law is that "the legally rele-
vant behavior of mentally disordered persons is a product of their
mental disorder and not of their free choice." 374 A state's power to
deprive an incompetent defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to
self-representation and to impose a substitute decisionmaker extends
from its parens patriae authority.375 Therefore, the justification for a
370 See Thomas Grisso, Legally Relevant Assessments for Legal Competencies, in EvALu-
ATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 59, at 21, 29-32 (2d ed. 2003); see also Morse, supra
note 187, at 539 ("The structure of all mental health laws is fundamentally the same:
all require findings of (1) a mental disorder, (2) a behavioral component, and (3) a causal
connection between the mental disorder and the behavioral component (at least in
principle).").
371 Grisso, supra note 370, at 29.
372 Id. For statistics and other information particular to guardianship, see Moye,
supra note 338, at 326, and Anderer, supra note 23, at 5-6, reporting that guardian-
ship statutes in thirty states include mental illness among specified disabilities, and
that thirty-six states employ more general terms such as mental deficiency, mental
disability, mental condition, mental infirmity, mental incapacity, weakness of mind,
mental weakness, mental deterioration, or in need of mental treatment.
373 See Anderer, supra note 23, at 7-8; see also In re Conservatorship of Goodman,
766 P.2d 1010, 1011-12 (Okla. Civ. App. 1988) ("If a purpose of the statute is to allow
involuntary intervention in the property affairs of citizens, absent a finding of mental
incompetence, it is unconstitutional as it is a clear violation of the State and Federal
Constitutional provisions which guarantee every citizen the right to life, liberty and
property." (citing U.S. CoNsT. amends V, X, XIV; OK CONST. art II, §2)); State ex rel.
Shamblin v. Collier, 445 S.E.2d 736, 740 (W. Va. 1994) (quoting In re Conservatorship of
Goodman, 766 P.2d at 1011-12).
374 Morse, supra note 187, at 539 n.19.
375 See generally Winick, supra note 64, at 1772 ("The parens patriae power allows
government to engage in decisionmaking in the best interest of persons who by rea-
son of age or disability are incapable of making such decisions for themselves.").
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state's intervention should be to protect the defendant from decisions
that stem from illness or disability rather than from those choices that
are the product of the individual's free will. 376 Put simply, individuals
capable of rational, autonomous decisionmaking should not have to
suffer the state's "protection" or the abdication of their ability to make
choices. Requiring demonstration that a functional deficit stems from
a mental disorder or disability should restrict the application of the
state's parens patriae power to its legitimate boundaries and "prevent
the application of the incapacity standard to those whose decisions are
merely eccentric or unpopular."377 A court has other tools besides
findings of incompetence to deal effectively with disruptive or
obstreperous behavior that is the product of a defendant's conscious,
rational will.3 78 Requiring a causation component thus serves as an
important safeguard of a defendant's autonomy and prevents exces-
sive state paternalism.
In addition, to some degree, a causation requirement would pre-
vent findings of incompetence based on functional deficits that are
temporary.379 For instance, a person could exhibit functional disabili-
ties as a result of sleep deprivation, grief, ingestion of medication, or
drug withdrawal. In such circumstances, a short passage of time could
resolve the underlying condition and restore the individual's func-
tional ability, thus proving unwarranted the rejection of self-represen-
tation in a particular case. 380 Therefore, to support a finding of
representational incompetence, the cognitive or behavioral deficit
should be the product of an enduring and disabling condition that is
beyond the individual's ability to control or ameliorate.
381
376 SeeJoel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CANADIANJ. PHIL. 105, 115 (1971) (argu-
ing that there must be "further evidence of derangement, or illness, or severe depres-
sion, or unsettling excitation" before an individual's actions may be deemed
involuntary).
377 Anderer, supra note 23, at 6.
378 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970).
379 See Grisso, supra note 370, at 30.
380 See generally Moye, supra note 338, at 325-26 (explaining that appointing a
guardian may not be necessary if the functional deficiency can be modified or
remediated easily). When a defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, but a sub-
stantial probability of future competence exists, courts regularly order mental health
treatment in an attempt to restore competence. See Stephen G. Noffsinger, Restora-
tion to Competency Practice Guidelines, 45 1r'LJ. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOL-
oGY 356 (2001). The great majority of defendants initially found incompetent to
stand trial regain competence after weeks or months of treatment. See Bruce J.
Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 980 (1985).
381 See Moye, supra note 339, at 325-26 (discussing state guardianship statutes'
requirement of a causal component).
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CONCLUSION
Was Jeffrey Connor competent to represent himself? Ultimately,
the trial judge found that he was.3 82 State law held that a defendant
competent to stand trial was necessarily competent to represent him-
self, so the judge's inquiry focused on Connor's powers of understand-
ing.383 The trial court also considered Connor's problem-solving
skills. The court determined that Connor had launched a "calcu-
lated" plan to thwart the prosecution by refusing to cooperate with
court-ordered competence exams and pretending to be comatose in
court.384 A consulting forensic psychiatrist opined that Connor's
unwillingness to cooperate likely was motivated by a fear of leaving
"the security of a correctional institution." 38 5 Connor ultimately
revealed his ruse to the court, explaining that the prior trial judge had
been a "total jerk."386 Connor's antics delayed his prosecution for
nearly two years. 38 7 This ability to manipulate the criminal justice sys-
tem, in the eyes of the presiding trial judge388 and the state supreme
court on appeal, 389 indicated that Connor possessed the degree of
competence required by the Sixth Amendment.
Other evidence supports the court's finding that Connor was
competent to represent himself at trial. Connor appeared to perceive
problematic situations, possessed a willingness to attend to the prose-
cution (once he stopped malingering), appeared capable of commu-
nicating adequately with the court and jury, and was able to withstand
382 See State v. Connor, 973 A.2d 627, 641-42 (Conn. 2009).
383 See id. at 656.
384 See id. at 641 & n.10.
385 Id. at 639 (quoting Dr. Huberto Temporini).
386 See id. at 641. Connor responded to Judge Espinosa's comment that he had
refused to speak or participate in court proceedings by stating, "Yes, I know. Because
the judge over in that other courtroom was a total jerk." Id. He also explained that
he had failed to cooperate because he did not want Lorenzen, a public defender, to
represent him and had been unsuccessful in dismissing him. Id.
387 See id. at 634-35 (failing to cooperate with a competence evaluation ordered
on June 2, 2004); id. at 642 (standing trial on April 27, 2006).
388 See id. at 641 ("[Connor] devised a calculated plan to disrupt the trial in front
of Judge Miano because he wasn't getting his way with his lawyer ....").
389 Id. at 652 ("Our conclusion [that the defendant was competent to stand trial
and to waive his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment] is buttressed ... by the
fact that the trial court reasonably found that the defendant had engaged in a pattern
of malingering, which apparently was designed to subvert the state's efforts to bring
the defendant's case to trial.").
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the stress of trial.3 9 0 He also demonstrated adequate decisionmaking
abilities, at least for certain key decisions. For instance, Connor
articulated several plausible reasons for waiving his right to counsel.
Connor explained that his court-appointed attorney "doesn't do his
job. He's not doing no justice for me. I can do a better job myself. 3 91
He also complained that his attorney did not respond to his letters or
phone calls,3 9 2  refused to call the witnesses whom Connor
requested,39 3 and had lied to him.394 One other reason expressed by
Connor for dismissing his attorney-that his counsel had "crippled"
him39 5-was potentially implausible. But, under the test delineated in
this Article, one plausible reason would suffice to demonstrate ade-
quate decisionmaking ability for waiving the right to representation.
Some aspects of Connor's representation at trial are more troub-
ling, however. First, it is unclear whether Connor was capable of sup-
porting his chosen defense with a plausible reason. Connor appeared
obsessed with outstanding detainers or warrants396 and seemed to
believe that the length or circumstances of his incarceration might
provide a defense to the charges of kidnapping, robbery, and lar-
ceny.39 7 The State argued that "[t]he fact that the defendant's trial
strategy may have been suspect. . . has no bearing" on whether he was
390 The sufficiency of Connor's abilities to gather information to define the con-
tours of a problem, generate alternative courses of action, and identify a plausible
origin for the prosecution is unclear.
391 Brief of the State of Connecticut-Appellee with Attached Appendix, supra
note 7, at 7 (quoting Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 6).
392 See Brief of the Defendant with Attached Appendix, supra note 1, at 9.
393 See Connor, 973 A.2d at 641. Connor apparently gave his attorney a list of 120
witnesses to call, of which his attorney selected five. Id.
394 Brief of the State of Connecticut-Appellee with Attached Appendix, supra
note 7, at 14 (quoting Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 25-26).
395 Brief of the Defendant with Attached Appendix, supra note 1, at 3. Though it
is unclear from the record, it is possible that Connor meant that counsel had failed to
obtain an earlier trial date so a medical issue in his leg was allowed to fester and
ultimately left him "crippled." See id. (responding to the trial court's question for why
Connor wanted to dismiss his attorney: "Because he crippled me... [H]e didn't-he
didn't get my speedy trial motion to go through, he waited all this time, three and a
half years and-and my foot is literally purple, it's-it's-it's frozen" (alterations in
original) (quoting Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 8)).
396 See Brief of the State of Connecticut-Appellee with Attached Appendix, supra
note 7, at 8.
397 See Connor, 973 A.2d at 642 ("The defendant... repeatedly referred to extrane-
ous matters relating to his health and his treatment in prison, including his allegation
that correction officers intended to kill him."); Brief of the Defendant with Attached
Appendix, supra note 1, at 10.
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competent to represent himself at trial.3 98 But, if Connor's defense
consisted of establishing the conditions of his confinement-and if
his selection of that defense was premised on a belief, animated by
mental illness or disability, that these conditions were somehow legally
relevant-then this choice may indicate insufficient decisionmaking
ability. However, it is also possible that Connor did not intend to
wage an affirmative defense but rather sought merely to point out the
shortcomings in the State's case. If this was his defensive strategy,
then the choice appears to have been both rational and somewhat
effective. According to the State, Connor successfully cross-examined
the victim by pointing out two inconsistencies in her testimony and
identified an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of an eyewit-
ness.3 99 The trial court recognized that Connor "handled things"
such as cross-examination "very well," 400 and Connor was ultimately
acquitted of one of the charges against him.40 1 Second, Connor may
have been unable to maintain focus or mental organization during
the proceeding.40 2 Under the framework proposed in this Article, an
inability to maintain mental organization over the course of the trial,
if the product of a mental illness or disability, would be a valid basis
for finding Connor incompetent to represent himself.
Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
remanded Connor to the trial court to determine Connor's compe-
tence, given his mental incapacity or impairment, to "'carry out the
basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of
counsel.'"403 The supreme court instructed the trial court to "con-
sider the manner in which the defendant conducted the trial proceed-
ings and whether he grasped the issues pertinent to those
proceedings, along with his ability to communicate coherently with
the court and the jury."404 The state supreme court declined to pro-
vide additional guidance on the substance of a measure for represen-
tational competence. 40 5
398 Brief of the State of Connecticut-Appellee with Attached Appendix, supra
note 7, at 27.
399 Id. at 31.
400 Id. at 32 (quoting Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 71).
401 Connor, 973 A.2d at 642. It is unclear the extent to which his acquittal of the
stalking charge was due to effective cross-examination.
402 See Reply Brief of the Defendant-Appellant with Attached Appendix at 2, 4,
Connor, 973 A.2d 627 (No. S.C. 18101).
403 Connor, 973 A.2d at 657 (quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175-76
(2008)).
404 Id.
405 Id. at 657 n.32.
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This Article draws upon social problem-solving theory to suggest
necessary elements of a representational competence standard. In
particular, problem-solving theory suggests that, to represent oneself
at a criminal trial, one should possess foundational abilities to per-
ceive problematic situations, generate alternative courses of action,
maintain mental organization, and communicate decisions to a func-
tionary of the court. Within the context of a prosecution, a defendant
should also possess the ability to identify a plausible source of the
prosecution, an ability to gather information to evaluate the state's
case, a willingness to attend to the prosecution, and an ability to with-
stand the stress of trial. Finally, for certain key decisions, such as
selecting the defense to pursue at trial, a defendant should be capable
of justifying a decision with a plausible reason. So long as a pro se
defendant possesses these capacities, his self-representation should
satisfy minimal requirements of reliability and fairness and accord suf-
ficient deference to the important principle of autonomy.
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